HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-01-05 CorrespondenceItem Number: 8.a.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Community Police Review Board: Recommendations Report
COMMUNITY POLICE REVIEW BOARD
A Board of the City of Iowa City
410 East Washington Street
Iowa City IA 52240-1826
(319)356-5043
December 28, 2020
City of Iowa Council Members
410 E Washington St
Iowa City, IA 52240
RE: CPRB Recommendations Report
Dear City Council Members:
Attached is a memorandum from the Community Police Review Board, in response
to paragraph eight of your Resolution No. 20-159. Thank you.
Sincerely,
David Selmer, Chair
Community Police Review Board
cc: Geoff Fruin, City Manager
Date: December 22, 2020
To: City Council
From: Community Police Review Board
Re: Report and recommendation of proposed changes to the Community Police Review Board
pursuant to Resolution 20-159 (Resolution of Initial Council Commitments addressing the Black Lives
Matter Movement and Systemic Racism in the wake of the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis
Police and calls for action from protesters and residents).
*********************************************************************
The members of the Iowa City Community Police Review Board (hereafter, "CPRE") submit the following
report and recommendation for proposed changes to the Community Police Review Board to enhance
community oversight of the Iowa City Police Department.
PROPOSED CHANGE 1—THAT IN INSTANCES OF A SUSTAINED MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT, THE CPRB BE
GIVEN INFORMATION ABOUT THE CORRESPONDING DISCIPLINE, AND THAT THE CPRB BE ALLOWED
TO INCLUDE IN ITS REPORT ITS FINDINGS ON WHETHER THE DISCIPLINE IS REASONABLE AND FAIR.
a. Proposed Change 1
The CPRB is requesting that, upon there being a sustained report of misconduct by the Chief of
Police/City Manager, that it also be provided:
A report from the Chief of Police/City Manager outlining the discipline to be
administered to the officer as a consequence of the misconduct. Within the report,
the Chief of Police/City Manager shall detail the factors used to determine the
discipline, including: (a) The severity of misconduct in the complaint; (b) Whether
the officer was found to have committed the same or similar type of misconduct in
the past; (c) Prior exemplary conduct of the officer; (d) Prior training related to the
circumstances in which the officer was found to have committed miscoMuct; (e)
Clarity of the conduct prescribed for an officer in the Iowa City Police Department's
Operating Procedures relevant to the circumstances in which the officererc'ommitted
misconduct; and (f) Other circumstances that call for enhancing or mitigating the
discipline to be administered.
Copies of the officer's: (a) discipline history; (b) exemplary conduct history; (c) the
officer's training history; (d) any operating procedures relevant to the Chief of
Police/City Manager's determination of discipline for the misconduct; (e) evidence
or documentation relied on by the Chief of Police/City Manager of enhancing or
mitigating circumstances that impacted the decision on the appropriate level of
discipline to be administered; and (f) any additional documents or other evidence
related to any of the above disclosures made by a reasonable request from the
CPRB.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
The most critical role of the Community Police Review Board ("CPRB") is to provide an
independent review, on behalf of the community, over the conduct of the Iowa City Police Department
("ICPD") including its Chief and all officers. When a complaint of misconduct is filed, presently, the CPRB
only has authority to agree or disagree with the findings of the Chief of Police and/or City Manager as to
whether or not misconduct has occurred. The CPRB is not provided with information about how an
officer is disciplined in cases where misconduct is found,
The CPRB believes having information regarding the disciplining of an officer, as well as any
other consequences to an officer where the officer has been found to have committed misconduct, is
integral to having effective oversight of the ICPD. Discipline information allows for oversight to make
sure the discipline matches the offense, to help deter future misconduct, to ensure discipline is
equitably administered, and to align the level of discipline and reasons for variances with precedent and
the community's values.
The importance of the CPRB having information is perhaps best explained by a hypothetical of
an officer using excessive force resulting in serious injury to a community member. Assume that the
Chief of Police issued a report finding the officer to have committed grave misconduct. Through the
current CPRB complaint process, the CPRB would review the Chief's report and file its own findings in
the CPRB report. In the current system, the CPRB would sustain the Chief's finding of misconduct, and
report the same to City Council, having no information on, and making no finding regarding, discipline to
the officer. Assume further, for this hypothetical, that the Chief issued no discipline to the offending
officer, despite the seriousness of the misconduct, and despite such lack of accountability being in clear
contradiction to the goals of the Iowa City Community. Such lack of discipline will go undetected by the
CPRB under the current system. Further, instead of being able to raise public awareness as to the lack of
appropriate accountability for misconduct in the ICPD, the CPRB report would be suggestive that the
ICPD was correctly managing complaints of misconduct in so far as it sustained (concurred with) the
ICPD's finding of misconduct. This hypothetical shows that it may do little good, or actual harm, for the
CPRB to only report on the issue of whether misconduct occurred, without being able to review and
opine as to the corresponding consequences when misconduct is found to have occurred.
Establishing a process through which the CPRB can review and report on disciplinary decisions
administered by the Chief of Police/City Manager will greatly improve the oversight into how -the ICPD
holds its officers accountable for misconduct, increase transparency, and raise community confidence in
the board's oversight capabilities.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
Consensus for proposing this change was reached by the CPRB as the members found it carefully
navigated the line of allowing the CPRB to remain an advisory review board and not an administration
board. That is, the CPRB would still be reviewing decisions made by the administers, as opposed to
administering discipline itself. The issue of how much administrative functions the CPRB should be
given, especially related to discipline, was the most debated subject for the CPRB. The majority opted to
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remain an advisory board for reasons that include: (1) that members are not trained in employment
matters, police procedures, or administration tasks; (2) the need to preserve the administration
autonomy of the Chief of Police to manage the department; and, (3) the potential liability that would
attach to CPRB members if they were the ones determining employment matters such as discipline.
Careful consideration must be given to protect the confidentiality of information such as
discipline information. It is understood that some legislative changes must occur to allow for a CPRB
review to be an exception to the confidentiality laws regarding discipline information. It is believed that
legislation could be narrowly tailored to permit such disclosures. This may only be possible if the
discipline part of the review were to remain confidential between the City Council and the CPRB and not
be a public record. Even with this limitation, the public could still have assurances that the discipline in
cases where misconduct is found is being reviewed, and that the CPRB can bring concerns to the City
Council in cases where the CPRB does not find the discipline to be reasonable or fair. Further, legislation
should be drafted so as to limit liability that may attach to a CPRB volunteer for any accidental disclosure
of confidential information.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
Some police review boards across the nation have access to disciplinary information and varying
degrees of related authority. In Daytona for example, the Police Department will "provide the board
with the full internal affairs file, unless any portions are determined to be exempt from disclosure or
confidential by law." (Daytona Beach close to launching Citizens' Police Review Board, 2020)'. The
review board will "discuss the allegations of a case, the adequacy of the investigation, the final discipline
that was meted out, and whether the police leadership response was appropriate" during their public
meetings. Id. In addition, "[t]he board will issue a written report that includes the name of the
complainant, the name of the accused officer or officers, a summary of the allegations and board
members' decisions to agree or disagree with the disciplinary findings." Id.
II. PROPOSED CHANGE 2 —THE CPRB SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUEST THE CITY
COUNCIL HAVE A DISCIPLINARY HEARING.
t
a. Proposed Change 2
The CPRB proposes that there be a mandatory meeting within 30 days of the CPR¢'s request to the
Chief of Police/City Manager between the CPRB and the Chief of Police/City Manager to discuss the
discrepancy in their respective opinions on the reasonableness and fairness of the discipline''tlie
Chief/City Manager propose to administer. This meeting would occur only in instances where -%all of the
following circumstances exist:
1. There has been a finding of misconduct in a complaint;
2. The Chief and/or City Manager have disclosed a report with all information on their decision
of how the officer will be disciplined for the misconduct (this assumes proposed change 1
has been accepted); and,
3. The CPRB disagrees with the reasonableness or fairness of the discipline to be administered
by the Chief and/or City Manager.
If, through the course of the meeting, the discrepancy is resolved either due to the Chief/City
Manager having made an independent decision to change the discipline to be administered, or the CPRB
changing their majority opinion as to the reasonableness and fairness of the discipline, the CPRB report
will note that the meeting occurred and that the CPRB agrees to the reasonableness and fairness of the
discipline the Chief/City Manager have determined to administer in the meeting.
If, despite the meeting, the CPRB cannot conclude that the discipline to be administered by the Chief
of Police is reasonable and fair, then the CPRB shall have the discretion to either (1) issue a report
detailing their disagreement with the discipline, or (2) make an additional request that the City Council
for Iowa City ("City Council") conduct a disciplinary hearing to independently determine whether the
proposed discipline is reasonable and fair. In the event of a hearing, the CPRB shall be allowed to
attend, and, in any event, be informed of all outcomes related to the hearing and/or disciplining of the
officer.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
The majority of the CPRB believe that this proposed change would allow for the effective
oversight of the disciplining of officers in cases where misconduct is found, while allowing the CPRB to
remain an agent for community review and not an administrator. The goal of the review is to try to
ensure that the operations of the ICPD are in line with the interests of the community. This goal can be
best achieved, when, in instances of disagreement between the CPRB and the Chief/City Manager as to
the appropriateness of the discipline to be administered when misconduct is found, a meeting can be
held to try to reconcile the discrepancy. The CPRB is not trained or authorized in matters of disciplining
police officers or employment law. Deference to the Chief/City Manager's autonomy in their capacity to
govern the ICPD and their knowledge of inner working in the police department beyond the discipline of
a particular case must also be given. The meeting is a forum that would allow for additional
consideration of the Chiefs/Manager's position that may better inform the CPRB members of the
reasonableness and fairness of the discipline to be administered. Similarly, the CPRB might inform the
Chief/Manager of the community's concerns and values as it relates to disciplining of the officer(s) for
the misconduct found. Thus, the meeting in instances of incongruity of opinions between the ICPD and
the CPRB, would hopefully resolve the discrepancy. Such resolution would potentially save time and
tax -payer money by foregoing the potential for a disciplinary hearing.
The meeting is very similar to recent ordinance changes proposed by the CPRB and adopted by
the City Council, to allow a meeting between the Chief/City Manager with the CPRB when there is 0
discrepancy between the finding of whether misconduct occurred by the Chief/City Manager75nd the
CPRB.-
The CPRB requests the additional authority of being able to recommend that the City Council conduct a
disciplinary hearing in cases where the CPRB and the ICPD disagree on the reasonableness and fairness
of the discipline in cases when misconduct is found. The CPRB believes this gives some "teeth" to its
findings that may not just be ignored by the ICPD in cases where there is a discrepancy. Importantly,
though, this change would still leave the CPRB being a "review" board, as the administrative functions
for determining and implementing the discipline would remain in the hands of the City Council and/or
the Chief/City Manager. The effectiveness of the CPRB having the authority to recommend to the City
Council to hold an independent disciplinary hearing for an officer should not be understated. First, it is
the consensus of the CPRB that sunlight is the best disinfectant, and shining light on discipline matters
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that need additional review for the public has bite itself. In addition, the very real threat of City Council
conducting a full disciplinary hearing, and certainly the consequences if the discipline proposed to be
administered by the ICPD was found to be unreasonable and unfair by the City Council after such a
hearing, give the CPRB's recommendations real effect.
C. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
The current CPRB is split on whether the CPRB should be given authority to administer discipline
itself. A majority of the members are of the opinion that the CPRB should remain an advisory board as
opposed to an administrative board rely on the following points in support of their position:
• The CPRB is not trained in employment law or matters of disciplining officers.
• The CPRB should not over -compromise the Chief of Police from carrying out administrative
functions.
• Privacy laws rightfully protect dissemination of sensitive employment information that would be
required to be disclosed to make a truly informed decision on the administering of discipline in
any situation.
• Liability would attach to members of the CPRB when they make determinations affecting an
officer's employment.
• The CPRB members are appointed, and not elected as officials to make such a decision for the
community.
Some members of the current CPRB urge that the CPRB be given the power to administer discipline.
In support of their position, they contend that CPRB decisions on misconduct are irrelevant unless their
decisions carry the power to issue corresponding discipline. They would like the CPRB to have the
authority to:
• Discipline an officer for misconduct;
• Discipline an officer for failing to cooperate with an interview or investigation into the
complaint;
• Require an officer to participate in mediation with a complainant;
• Call for a public hearing to hire/fire an officer or Chief of Police; and,
• If there were a disciplinary hearing that there be opportunities for the public to comment
and the final decision as to the appropriate discipline to administer would:' made by a
majority vote of the combined bodies of the CPRB and the City Council.
CPRB members wanting authority to discipline officers directly contend that such authority and
public disclosure of the disciplining of an officer is necessary to enhance the understanding of -the
officers of the ICPD's interactions with citizens, give opportunities to explain officer actions to citizens,
enhance satisfaction with the complaint process, empower the community members — complainant and
non -complainants alike, give opportunity to learn from mistakes of officers, and enhance the
opportunity to meet community goals. They further contend with regards to the public hearing for
hiring/firing of the Chief of Police, that such a public event would greatly improve the community
confidence in their oversight of the ICPD by allowing real feedback and accountability to the community
members directly.
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Ultimately, the consensus of the CPRB was propose the limited change for the CPRB to allow it to
review discipline matters and, in the cases where the CPRE disagreed with the ICPD as to the
reasonableness and fairness of the discipline, to have authority to request the City Council have a
disciplinary hearing.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
Regarding the authority to review or administer discipline:
o The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Citizen Review Board makes
recommendations to the Sheriff regarding discipline, policies, procedures, and programs
(2020)"
o Columbus, Ohio, has a measure on the ballot that would create a review board that
would "make recommendations to the Division of Police, including recommendations
for disciplinary actions if relevant."iii
o The Virginia State Senate recently advanced a bill that would allow review boards to
""make binding disciplinary determinations in cases that involve serious breaches of
departmental and professional standards."
o Steven Morrison, a professor at the University of North Dakota School of Law, said
police review "boards are probably better than nothing, but as far as changing things he
believes they have minimal value unless they are given enforcement power."v
Regarding the opinion of a minority group of the CPRB that the CPRB should have authority to
require mediation between a complainant and officer(s):
o According to a guide from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, "[m]ediation focuses on mutual understanding, problem solving, and
reconciliation - all vital aspects of increasing trust between parties." °' The guide further
details mutually beneficial outcomes for mediation. Id. The guide reports that, "[i]n a
series of focus groups in Omaha, Nebraska, individuals were asked to discuss whether
they would file a complaint in response to a hypothetical incident of police rn conduct
and what they wanted to achieve if they did. Many participants indicated a O'esire for an
..:I : .._...
explanation or apology from either the officer or a responsible official;'er they wanted
an opportunity to express their views to the officer in person." Id. F
o The Alberta Law Enforcement Review Board found that in some instance's, "all the
citizen wants is an apology" and that mediation provides the officer with a forum in
which to "explain to a citizen why he or she acted in a particular manner" (Alberta Law
Enforcement Review Board 1997)". "Research indicates that complainants who choose
mediation do report higher levels of satisfaction than those who choose the traditional
process." Id.
o "Mediation introduces a new dimension to police accountability. In traditional
complaint procedures, an officer accused of misconduct is directly accountable only to
other police officers: internal affairs investigators, the immediate supervisor, and, in
some instances, the chief of police v"'(Walker 2001). The officer never has to directly face
or account to the citizen who has filed the complaint. In contrast, an officer participating
in mediation is directly accountable to the citizen who filed the complaint. Mediation
may help personalize American policing." Id.
o In her report on community justice, restorative justice, and community policing,
Caroline Nicholl explains that community justice "is shifting criminal justice from a
purely adversarial approach to include problem -solving methods" (Nicholl 2000a).
o The DOJ paper% would be a tremendous resource in planning as it goes beyond the
benefits of mediation and details various practical ways to create a program. It states
that "mediation is much less expensive than traditional complaint investigations. The
Minneapolis Civilian Review Authority (CRA) pays a flat rate of $2,000 a year to the
Minneapolis Mediation Center (a community-based nonprofit organization supported by
funding from city and county government agencies, civic organizations, and individuals
and clients) to provide mediators, who work pro bono, to handle police cases."
o There is a nonprofit mediation center in Iowa City, Mediation Services of Eastern Iowa
(About Us - MSEI, 2020)x', with the structure in place like suggests.
Regarding the authority to hire/fire the Chief of Police:
o In Oakland, California the Mayor is required "to appoint any new Chief of Police from a
list of candidates provided by the Commission" (2020)x"
III. PROPOSED CHANGE 3 —THAT AN ACCUSED OFFICER BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH A
CPRB INVESTIGATIONOR BE DISCIPLINED BY THE CHIEF OF POLICE/CITY MANAGER.
a. Proposed change 3 —
The CPRB is requesting that the ordinances be changed so that the Chief of Police shall discipline
an officer in the event an officer does not cooperate fully with a CPRB investigation. Discipline should
occur for failure to cooperate with an investigation regardless if the officer is the one accused of the
misconduct. Cooperation includes appearing for, and giving thoughtful responses under oath to,
interview questions by the CPRB.
b. Reasoning for the proposal "= "
Currently, as part of the CPRB investigation, the CPRB has the authority to interview=wvitnesses,
including officers, both accused and non -accused alike. However, there is no present duty or order that
requires an officer to participate in the investigation or interview. Similarly, there is no repercussion to
the officer for not participating. Without such a duty or repercussion, it is likely that an Officer will not
participate in the investigation, respond to a request to be interviewed, or participate in a name -clearing
hearing. Indeed, the collective experience of the CPRB over the years has proven this to be true. With
such repercussions, it is much more likely the Officer's participation can be secured, greatly enhancing
the CPRB's investigation and ensuring more accuracy of its findings and reporting.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
At least some members of the current CPRB have concerns over the legality of compelling an
officer to testify in instances of alleged misconduct, especially when the officer may be asked to provide
self-incriminating information.
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Also, and relatedly, officers may want or need to be represented by legal counsel to protect
their interests. The CPRE, in kind, will likely also need an attorney present for consultation. This has the
potential to add a large amount of taxpayer expense to the review process. It is hoped that the
discretion of the CPRB would be exercised with this expense in mind so that the requirement for
compelling testimony under oath would be used judiciously. It is believed such interviews may be
compelled sparingly given the prevalent access to body -cameras, car -cameras, and other data that may
make this part of the interview process superfluous. That said, without question, officers will be
interviewed if deemed necessary to complete a thorough investigation of the facts.
Further, in the interests of fairness, an officer would reasonably want the Complainant to be
required to be interviewed as well. Hand in hand with this, is the chilling effect on community members
filing a complaint if they may be interviewed by attorneys.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
None.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGE 4 - A COMPLAINANT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO RESPOND TO THE
CHIEF'S FINDINGS IN THE CHIEF'S REPORT BEFORE THE CPRB SHALL CONDUCT ITS
INVESTIGATION.
a. Proposed Change 4 —
The CPRB is requesting that, after the Chief of Police/City Manager has issued a report to the
CPRB with the findings of fact and whether allegations of misconduct are sustained, that a copy of that
report be disclosed to a complainant. A complainant would then have opportunity to respond to the
Chief/City Manager report for the CPRB to consider in advance of their investigation.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
Presently, the CPRB conducts its investigation after receiving a copy of the Chief's re.port:aThe
Chief's report summarizes a narrative -type complaint, identifies specific allegations of misconduct, and
makes conclusions for the same. In some instances the narrative complaint and the specific -allegations
of misconduct are clear. In others, it may be somewhat challenging to ascertain all of the allegations in
the Complaint — most likely prepared without the assistance of legal counsel.
While the CPRB has the capacity in its review to interview a complainant in the cases of ambiguity of
allegations of misconduct, this is not required. Further, there may be an unintended chilling effect on
the filing of complaints if a complainant is required to be interviewed; many people would be
uncomfortable about speaking to a panel of strangers investigating their sensitive matters. In any event,
there is not any opportunity, otherwise, for a complainant to provide clarifying information or object to
how the Chief/City Manager characterized the allegations of misconduct in their report. If a
complainant were given an automatic opportunity to review the Chief's report and respond to the CPRB
in a timely fashion, the CPRB report can be more accurate, and it would be more likely that a
complainant would feel his allegations were fairly identified and reviewed.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
9
One can conceive that by providing a response after the ICPD has responded to a complaint may
provide a complainant with a vehicle to keep tacking on complaints. Such a step might allow "too many
bites at the apple." Also, in the interests of equity, the Chief and/or City Manager may want or need to
have an opportunity to respond to any additional report of misconduct or clarification by the
Complainant. At some point the process must stop and run its course. Still, it is believed that with
careful procedural guidelines, a response from the Complainant could be incorporated that would
benefit the CPRB's review.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
None.
V. PROPOSED CHANGE 5 —THE ONLINE DATABASE OF OFFICER COMPLAINTS SHALL BE
IMPROVED TO ALLOW FOR QUICK SEARCHES OFCOMPLAINT HISTORY AND A
COMPUTERIZED RISK -MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO ANALYZE TRENDS.
a. Proposed Change 5 —
The CPRB is requesting that the online public database be enhanced so that one can search
complaints, discipline, and training records of any officer. Currently, to protect sensitive identifying
information such as the officer's name, each officer of the ICPD has been assigned an individual tracking
number. This number can be used in lieu of officers' names to allow for tracking of complaints, reports
on complaints, discipline, and training records for any officer while still protecting the privacy and safety
of the officers.
Notably, the database shall include all complaints, not just those filed by members of the
community or through the CPRB process. The database shall be searchable for snapshots for -the
number and type of complaints in any month or any year, their resolution, and any trends. A
computerized risk -management tracking system should be implemented to quickly analyze dna in
search of trends.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
The CPRB believes that data tracking is important to its effectiveness of examining trends and
repeated instances of misconduct carried out by a few of the officers. When evidence shows that
officers who engage in misconduct tend to do so repeatedly, it is vital to be able to identify officers who
have emerging patterns of complaints. Treating each complaint as an isolated incident without tracking
data of individual officers makes it impossible to discover problematic officers and remove them from
public engagement.
Having a database online that allows the public to quickly identify all complaints for an officer
will allow patterns of conduct for an individual officers to be identified and investigated. Similarly,
snapshots of the type of complaints over a month, and a year, will allow for identification of trends and
areas where more oversight is needed.
Further, if the CPRB is given authority to review discipline, having access to other complaints,
discipline, and training will be important to assess the reasonableness and fairness of the discipline. The
database should be searchable type of complaint, and findings of misconduct, on a monthly and annual
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report, and identify the officers under the categories. This would allow any member of the community
to see the trends and raise concern in the public section of the CPRB meetings.
While some members of the CPRB would like names to be released, the clear majority disagreed
out of concern for officer safety. A compromise was reached whereby each officer will be assigned a
unique, consistent, anonymous identification number that would accompany each complaint, to allow
for more thorough tracking and review while still protecting the privacy of the officer.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
Extreme caution should be taken to protect against disclosure of identifying information of
officers outside of their tracking number to protect the safety of the officer.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
Regarding the need to identify repeat offenders/trends:
o According to a 2001 National Institute of Justice Research Brief (Walker, Alpert and
Kenney, 2020)x"', "10 percent of officers cause 90 percent of the problems," and
investigations have revealed that approximately "two percent of all officers are
responsible for 50 percent of all citizen complaints."
o A publication by the West Virginia Advisory Committee to the US Commission on
Civil Rights states that "Improving existing accountability procedures will assist in
preventing police misconduct and will provide the public with confidence that such
acts of misbehavior will be documented and that officers will be disciplined
accordingly."x"
• Regarding the use of tracking systems:
o Computerized tracking systems have been installed in various police departments
across the nation, including the Pittsburgh city police, the Los Angeles Police
Department, and the New Jersey State Police, among others. In Pittsburgh, reports
of police misconduct have dropped by more than half on average since the tracking
system was installed." (Chapter 4: Alternative Models for Police Disciplinary
Procedures, 2020)x°
VI. PROPOSED CHANGE 6 — ALL COMPLAINTS OF MISCONDUCT SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MONTHLY DISCLOSURES TO THE CPRE.
a. Proposed Change 6 —
The CPRB is requesting that copies of all complaints filed by a community member to the ICPD
be included with the monthly packet of information the ICPD discloses to the CPRE.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
Currently, the CPRB is only given the reports from community members that are made to the
CPRB directly, as well as a quarterly summary of complaints made to the ICPD. If the CPRB is provided
with copies of the reports made to the ICPD and not the CPRE, it allows for the CPRB to exercise
10
discretion for doing additional independent investigation of the complaint. Disclosure on a monthly
basis would allow the CPRB to do so in a timely fashion.
Also, since the George Floyd incident, it has become even more obvious that many persons in
our community did not have knowledge of the CPRB or its functions. There is a very real possibility that
complainants may not have knowledge of the CPRB when filing a complaint directly with the ICPD. This
is especially true with Iowa City being a college town with many students temporarily transplanted in
Iowa City. Having the reports filed with the ICPD within a month of when they were filed would help
protect against these community members missing out on the oversight of the CPRB in instances they
did not know of the CPRB.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
None.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
None.
VII. PROPOSED CHANGE 7 - CPRB SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT QUARTERLY REPORTS TO REVIEW FOR CERTAIN TRENDS
a. Proposed Change 7—
The CPRB is requesting that, included in the quarterly reports provided by ICPD, that it also be
given the following information:
i. Total number of detained individuals;
ii. Demographics of the individuals detained;
iii. Total number of arrested individuals; and,
iv. Demographics of those arrested.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
Perhaps as important as providing an independent examination and report of individual claims,
is to provide such oversight for trends and larger ways in which the Iowa City Police are exeE,uting its
duties on a day-to-day basis. While the CPRB is provided with some information already to assist with
such larger oversight, some additional information would be useful to help protect against intentional or
unintentional bias or disproportionate outcomes.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
None.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
None.
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Vlll. PROPOSED CHANGE 8 — CPRB SHOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HIRE AN INDEPENDENT
AUDITOR TO REVIEW THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S INTERNAL INVESTIGATION
PROCEDURES.
a. Proposed Change 8 —
The CPRB is requesting that it be given authority and sufficient funding to hire an independent
auditor to review ICPD's internal investigation procedures.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
Since ultimate authority for investigatory outcomes is held by the ICPD, it is vital to ensure that
its procedures are unbiased, complete, and follow best practices. A regularly scheduled independent
audit (every 1-2 years at the CPRB's discretion) would provide an opportunity for the Police Department
to receive consistent review and recommendations for improvement that can be implemented in the
interims. In addition, the CPRB should have the authority to recommend an audit if they believe that
there is an immediate procedural issue that cannot be reconciled through other means.
None.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
Other cities that have used independent auditors to review police procedures include but are
not limited to:
o Charleston SC (https://www.charleston-sc.gov/2250/Racial-Bias-Audit),
o North Charleston SC, (Yee, 2020)X' (Dennis and Yee, 2020)x",
o Salem NH, (Audit of Community Policing Policies, Procedures and Programs, 2020)xv''
(Police Audit I Salem NH, 2020)x'x,
o Albany NY (https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Albany-hiring-firm-to-studv-
racia I -bias -in -police -15509749. php),
o Roswell (https://www.ajc.com/news/local/rosweII-pay-77k-for-externai. audit-police-
department/EfCl6kzsYigRhzhIOBUYSK/ ),
o Vallejo CA (https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/north-bay/vallerx oto-reigase-
third-party-audit-of-police-dept-next-week/2308338/),
o Eugene OR (https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18785/'Civilian=Review-
Board-Policies), w
o Los Angeles CA,
(http://www.lapdonline.oriz/inside the lard/content basic view/8772)
IX. PROPOSED CHANGE 9 — CPRB SHALL BE PROVIDED CITY FUNDING TO PROMOTE
AWARENESS OF THE CPRB AND ENHANCE ACCESSIBILITY TO ITS SERVICES.
a. Proposed change 9—
The—
The CPRB is requesting that it have sufficient funds provided to advertise its existence, services,
and make its services more accessible to the public. This would include, but not be limited to, funds for
12
outreach activities, meetings being streamed live, and enhancements to the website to make them
more user friendly.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
After the George Floyd incident and the protests, attendance at our meetings and public forum
was high, and a common report from feedback from the community was that they did not previously
know of the CPRB. It was also obvious many in the community who were informed enough to attend
the CPRB forum did not have a clear understanding of the purpose or function of the CPRB. Presently,
there is little effort or funding provided to inform the community about the CPRB.
To be effective, the CPRB needs to improve public engagement. The CPRB proposes the
following specifically?
1. Making the CPRB website more user friendly;
2. Having all CPRB meetings live streamed on the City of Iowa City
Facebook page (and posted about on that page in advance),
3. Holding community forums twice a year,
4. Having basic CPRB contact info printed on the back of every police
officer card. (The suggestion was offered during our 2020 Community
Forum by one of the longtime community members who just recently
learned of the CPRB);
5. Having funds to host other awareness activities from time to time; and,
6. Having information about the CPRB services provided to every
community member at the time they are issued a citation or at the time
they are released from custody in the event they were arrested.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
None.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
The Eugene, OR CRB Code states that its board is to "conduct outreach activities and disseminate
information throughout the community" and "seek open, candid and non -defensive dialogue with
stakeholders to both educate and learn from different communities in Eugene." (EUGENE CIVILIAN
REVIEW BOARD POLICIES and PROCEDURES MANUAL)xx
X. PROPOSED CHANGE 10 —COMPLAINANTS SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO A LAWYER AND SOCIAL
WORKER/MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL WITH TRAUMA AWARENESS TRAINING FOR PURPOSES
OF ASSISTING COMPLAINANTS THROUGHOUT THE COMPLAINT PROCESS.
a. Proposed Change 10 —
The CPRB proposes that community members have access to both legal counsel and a social
worker or other medical professional with trauma awareness training for purposes of facilitating and
assisting complainants with a CPRB complaint throughout the complaint process.
13
b. Reasoning for the proposal
It is reasoned that community members file complaints against officers because they believe
they have been wronged. It is therefore important to acknowledge that the experience may have been
traumatic for a complainant. Indeed, some community members have reported the trauma from the
underlying event, and a separate trauma from fear associated with reporting the complaint, including
fear of retaliation, fear of sharing a personal traumatic event, and fear of their claims being judged as
either validated or invalidated. Such trauma deserves a trained professional to help a complainant at
the outset of the complaint process and through to its resolution.
It should be recognized that in CPRB complaints, there is an inherent imbalance of power due to
the complaints being against an officer who has several advantages including access to reports and
information, familiarity with procedures and personnel, and levels of tort immunity. While the CPRB
tries to be accessible to all members of the community and strives to make the complaint process as
straight forward as possible, the process can be daunting and pose certain challenges. This may be
especially true for marginalized populations such as community members that are undocumented,
unhoused, sex workers, drug users, and/or formerly incarcerated. Put simply, some members of the
community simply do not have the capacity or resources to file an effective complaint. Having access to
legal counsel would greatly assist community members with the filing of complaints. They will be
informed of legalities, have clarity of the process, as well as other assistance that would greatly enhance
the complaint process.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
At least some members of the CPRB are of the opinion that If Iowa City provides the
complainant services such as use of a lawyer and/or social worker/medical professional with trauma
awareness training, that the mere act of providing such services would be an admission of culpability by
the City on behalf of the ICPD for its alleged conduct in any complaint. Further, such services could be
laying a foundation for a complainant to initiate legal actions against an officer and/or Iowa City
regardless of the actual merits of a complaint.
The majority of the CPRB believe that Iowa City can provide the legal and medical services for a
complainant without acknowledging culpability. To the contrary, legal counsel and trauma/medical
professionals for the complaint process in some instances might facilitate a more thorough and:
meaningful resolution of an incident for a complainant — regardless of the complaint being sustained or
even filed. Having assistance to understand the events and processes might reduce the need fax
additional litigation and draw a sense of closure and completeness to the incident in which the
community member perceived to be harmed.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
• Evidence suggests that individual -level secondary prevention interventions aimed at bolstering
resilience and reducing the likelihood of adverse effects following trauma are effective."
(authors & Magruder).xxi
• "Trauma affects how victims see themselves" and "these beliefs affect how victims respond to
services and the criminal justice system and underscore the importance of task forces taking a
14
trauma -informed approach, not only through service delivery but also throughout the
investigation" process. (Human Trafficking Task Force e -Guide)""'
• "Public health impact of trauma exposure is staggering for both communities and individuals"
and that "the social environment can stimulate recovery after trauma." (authors & Magruder).
• "The perception of social support has been found to be an influential factor for the effects of
traumatic events on the individual as well as the community" (Kleber, 2019)x%"'
• "Many suggest that a true public health approach requires mental health integration beyond
primary care to include sectors such as education, justice, welfare, and labor through
partnerships with government, non-governmental organizations, and the faith -based
community." (Collins, Insel, Chockalingam, Daar, & Maddox, 2013; Ko et al., 2008) Providing a
professional trained in trauma awareness to complainants would be a step towards such
integration.
• Urbana, Illinois Community Police Review Board has a designated representative to provide
mental support and other relevant assistance with the complaint process for the complainant.
(https://www.city.urbana.i1.us/ Agendas - Packets - Minutes/Agendas 2006/07-10-
2006/Citizen Police Review Ordinance Draft.pdf). See, also: Columbia, Missouri
(https://www.como.gov/law/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/CPRB-Brochure pdf), Dallas,
Texas (http://mothersagainstpolicebrutaIity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Task-Force-
Report-on-Citizen-Review-of-Police-15-Februa rv-2017-FI NAL.pdf).
XI. PROPOSED CHANGE 11— EXPAND THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CPRB FROM FIVE TO SEVEN
OR NINE MEMBERS, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND
REPRESENTATION FROM A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLICE OR POLICE
POLICY EXPERT.
a. Proposed Change 11—
The CPRB requests to change its membership from the current five -member -board to having
seven or nine members. In selecting from candidates for the CPRB, an emphasis shall be placed on
persons being of a minority race, requiring at least four of the members shall be from a minority race.
Further, it should be made mandatory that at least one member be a current or former.,rnemb_prof the
police force or otherwise considered an expert in police procedures and/or police policies.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
Having additional members increases the diverse opinions of the board, will disperse -the
workload, and allow for larger subgroups to meet without constituting a quorum and triggering the
public meeting requirement. As is, the current members are volunteering time to review individual
complaints. This almost always entails watching hours of video footage, possible additional
investigations, procedural discussions, voting, report writing, and review of report before its filing.
Members also review various police ordinances and policies, as well as quarterly reports from the police.
Besides this, members are tasked with writing public forum reports, and, from time to time, having
various sub -committees for purposes of completing tasks. Presently, subcommittees can only be
comprised of two members as more would entail a forum requiring a public meeting. There is a large
15
time and workload commitment required of the CPRB members. Proposed change outlined in this
document would only increase, in some cases dramatically, the amount of work being carried by a five -
member volunteer board. With additional members, the individual burden would be lessened.
With regards to the composition being favorable to minority groups, this stems from an agenda
to help achieve racial equality in the justice system. Objective data points to clear racial disparities in
policing on a statewide and national level. Having a minimum composition of members from minority
groups for overseeing the police would help protect minority interests in the carrying out of CPRB
reviews. The Board feels there should be no less than three members who are of a minority race if the
CPRB is increased to seven members, and no less than four members who are of a minority race if the
CPRB is increased to nine members for its composition.
To help ensure fairness and equity in the review process, the recommendation that one
member of the board have a police background shall become mandatory. It is important that, when
reviewing police conduct, someone with police experience and training be consulted. If there were
concerns over objectivity, perhaps the residency requirements for this member should be waived,
and/or a police procedure expert be retained for the CPRB to consult with regularly during the closed
sessions.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
None.
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
None.
XII. PROPOSED CHANGE 12 - CPRB complaints should be permitted whether filed
anonymously or through third persons so long as there is sufficient knowledge 'of the
underlying circumstances. is
a. Proposed Change 12 —
The CPRB is requesting that complaints be permitted whether they are filed anonyrh-ously or
through third persons without naming individual complainant, so long a sufficient personal knowledge
of the underlying circumstances is alleged in the complaint.
b. Reasoning for the proposal
The purpose of the CPRB is to provide effective community oversight of the ICPD. If information
can be brought forward to help identify instances of misconduct without the need of the person who
was perceived to have been harmed being personally named, the CPRB procedures should allow it,
provided there are sufficient safeguards against unfounded complaints being filed. Allowing for
anonymity may well remove a very real obstacle preventing community members from filing
complaints: fear of public humiliation and/or retaliation by those implicated in the complaint. This could
especially be true with several marginalized members of the community including those that are
undocumented, unhoused, sex workers, drug users, and/or those formerly incarcerated. These
members statistically have a higher number of interactions with the police and are more likely to be
16
subject to police misconduct. This change would provide some assurances that they can file a complaint
without retaliation.
Perception of fairness and equity is also important for the community members to have faith in
the CPRB system. Currently, for a CPRB complaint, the identity of the complainant is disclosed while the
identity of an officer implicated in a complaint of misconduct is not. This seems inequitable, especially
considering the inherent power imbalance in filing a complaint against a police officer, and can be
resolved with the option to file anonymously.
To protect against unfettered complaints being filed against officers, a threshold requirement
for the complainant to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate the complainant has personal knowledge of
the underlying circumstances alleged in a complaint should be put in place.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
Some members of the CPRB are fearful that allowing a complaint without the identity of the
complainant and their respective attestation to the truth of the statements (the current system), will
open the floodgates for frivolous complaints. Those minority members believe the CPRB complaint
process could be used to harass officers and deter them from interacting with certain members of the
community that might try to use the process to retaliate against officers themselves.
The majority of the CPRB believes that the safeguard of requiring demonstration of personal
knowledge of the events will check potential abuses. Another procedural safeguard that could be put in
place would be to give the CPRB authority to summarily dismiss a complaint if there is not enough
credible information in the filing of an anonymous complaint. Further, until abuses of frivolous
complaint filing occurs with regularity, the majority of the CPRB believes the benefits for incorporating
this change outweigh the costs.
Additional concerns have been raised about the procedural issues anonymous complaints will raise.
For example, how will the Chief of Police/City Manager and the CPRB contact the complainant to inform
them of the steps in the process? It is understood that as part of the Chief's obligations under the
current ordinance, Chief must interview a complainant; something that cannot be done if thi '
complainant is anonymous.
The majority members believe that there could be procedural changes such as a liaison cd_ntact or
some requirement for contact information to be disclosed to the CPRB but remain confidentidl to the
police and public. Currently, the officer's identity is kept confidential in the complaints. Ther6 may be
solutions akin to the confidentiality measures for the officers that could be extended to a complainant
that would allow for anonymous complaints to be filed without procedural technicalities that would
make them impossible.
d. Additional sources relevant to consideration of the proposed change
The National Association For Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) supports
anonymous reporting and complaints of police misconduct may be filed anonymously in:
Cleveland, OH's"' -
Anonymous reporting in Seattle, WAxxvi
Anonymous reporting in Wolcott, CTxx°"
17
XIII. PROPOSED CHANGE 13 — THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR FILING A CPRB COMPLAINT
SHALL BE LENGTHENED FROM 90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT,
TO 180 DAYS AFTER THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT.
a. Proposed Change 13 —
The CPRB requests that the timeline for allowing a member of the community to file a complaint
with the CPRB be extended from 90 days after the underlying incident of misconduct alleged in the
complaint to 180 days from the same.
b. Reason for the proposal
When a community member has had an interaction with an officer that may warrant the filing of
a complaint, there needs to be time to process the occurrence, and perhaps handle other ways the
encounter impacted them including loss of job, criminal charges, and trauma. The CPRB believes 180
days from the date of the alleged incident better accommodates complainants with those
circumstances. The CPRB further believes that such an extension still preserves the recency of the
events so that memories may be recalled and evidence gathered.
c. Additional comments/concerns for consideration
Some members of the CPRB support having no statute of limitations. In support they site the
trauma and fear that may be associated with being a victim of police misconduct that would take
perhaps several years or more to bring forward. The majority of the CPRB members, however, believe
the 180 days is a better balance between allowing sufficient time to file a complaint -and tkre ability to
investigate a complaint with recent evidence. y'
d. Additional sources relevant to the proposed change
For comparison, the deadline to file a complaint to either the Iowa Civil Rights Commission or
the Iowa City Office of Equity and Human Rights is 300 days.'"""
' The Daytona Beach News -Journal. 2020. Daytona Beach Close To Launching Citizens' Police Review Board. [online]
Available at: <https://www.news-journalonline.com/story/news/local/volusia/2020/09/24/daytona-beach-to-choose-
citizens-police-review-board-members/5850368002/> [Accessed 28 October 2020].
2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/InternalAffairs-CitizenReviewBoard.aspx> [Accessed
28 October 2020].
"' 2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/InternalAffairs-CitizenReviewBoard.aspx> [Accessed
28 October 2020].
"2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/InternalAffairs-CitizenReviewBoard.aspx> [Accessed
28 October 2020].
" 2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/InternalAffairs-CitizenReviewBoard.aspx> [Accessed
28 October 2020].
18
Walker, Samuel, Carol Archbold and Leigh Herbst, Mediating Citizen Complaints Against Police Officers: A Guide
for Police and Community Leaders Web Version (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, (2002)
"" Alberta Law Enforcement Review Board. 1997. Judgments. Edmonton, AB: Alberta Law Enforcement Review
Board.
Walker, S. 2001. Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
'x Nicholl, C. 2000a. Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative Justice. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office.
I Walker, Samuel, Carol Archbold and Leigh Herbst, Mediating Citizen Complaints Against Police Officers: A Guide
for Police and Community Leaders Web Version (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, (2002)
" MSEI. 2020. About Us - MSEl. [online] Available at: <https:Hmediateiowa.org/about-us/> [Accessed 6 November 2020].
x" Cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com. 2020. [online] Available at: <https://cao-
94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/oak062931.pdf> [Accessed 1 November 2020].
x'" Walker, S., Alpert, G. and Kenney, D., 2020. Early Warning Systems: Responding To The Problem Police Officer.
[online] Ncjrs.gov. Available at: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/188565.pdf> [Accessed 6 November 2020].
x'" Coping with Police Misconduct in West Virginia: Citizen Involvement in Officer Disciplinary Procedures—A
Review of Existing Law, Legislative Initiatives, and Disciplinary Models. (n.d.). Retrieved September„, 2020, from
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/wvOlO4/main.htm
xv Usccr.gov. 2020. Chapter 4: Alternative Models For Police Disciplinary Procedures. [online] -Available at:
<https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/wv0104/ch4.htm> [Accessed 6 November 20201.
x"'Yee, G., 2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.postandcourier.com/news/north-charleston-officials-cast-first-
votes-toward-racia I -bias -a udit-of-police-department/article_682b6916-01db-11eb-b325-d3855f5916pe.html>
[Accessed 31 October 2020].
x"i Dennis, R. and Yee, G., 2020. [online] Available at: <https://www.postandcourier.com/news/north-charleston-
awards-contract-for-long-awa ited-race-bias-a udit-of-police-force/a rticle_9841779e-09a6-11eb-b038-
cb026ceed72b.html> [Accessed 2 November 2020].
x""' Cityofsalem.net. 2020. Audit Of Community Policing Policies, Procedures And Programs. [online] Available at:
<https://www.cityofsalem.net/Pages/police-audit.aspx> [Accessed 1 November 20201.
xix Townofsalemnh.org. 2020. Police Audit / Salem NH. [online] Available at:
<https://www.townofsalemnh.org/home/news/police-audit> [Accessed 30 October 2020].
xx Coping with Police Misconduct in West Virginia: Citizen Involvement in Officer Disciplinary Procedures—A
Review of Existing Law, Legislative Initiatives, and Disciplinary Models. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2020, from
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/wvol04/main.htm
xxi Authors, A., & Magruder, K. (n.d.). Trauma is a public health issue. Retrieved October 11, 2020, from
https://www.ta ndfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20008198.2017.1375338
19
xxff Human Trafficking Task Force e -Guide. (n.d.). Retrieved November 04, 2020, from
https://www.ovcttac.gov/taskforceguide/egu id a/4-su pporti ng-victims/41-using-a-tra u ma -inform ed -approach/
xxffi Kleber, R. (2019, June 06). Trauma and Public Mental Health: A Focused Review. Retrieved October 13, 2020,
from https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00451/full
"" FAQs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 9, 2020, from
https://www. nacole.org/fags?fbclid=IwAR2fuO7OU7ixwrOkzl risKZkh bx8j BIq_iOG06epR1wOz8RuQ_lTUvleo9l
xx" City of Cleveland Office of Professional Standards Civilian Police Review Board. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11,
2020, from http://www.clevelandohio.gov/sites/default/files/ops_publications/0PS_BrochureEnglish.pdf
xx"' Anonymous Complaint Form. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2020, from
https://www.seattle.gov/opa/complaints/file-a-complaint/anonymous-complaint-form
x""" Civilian Police Review Board. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2020, from
https://www.wolcottpd.org/about/civilian-police-review-board/
""' Iowa Civil Rights Commission 2020. [online] Available at: (hgps://www.ic og v.or city-government/departments-and-
Iowa City Office of Equity and Human Rights divisions/equity-and-human-rights); 2020. [online] Available at:
(https://icre.iowa.gov/file-complaint).
'wti7
20
Item Number: 8.b.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Dr. Elisa Hernandez Perez - On the Preliminary Plan to Restructure ICPD
Amy Charles - recommendations re police restructuring
Bruce Haupert - News Release re Preliminary Plan
Donna Ruth Beary- Restructuring I C P D
Kellie Fruehling
From: Elisa Hernandez Perez <elisa.hdez88@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 7:19 AM
To: Council; Geoff Fruin
Subject: On the Preliminary Plan to Restructure ICPD
A
RISK
Dear city council members and city manager,
In relation to the recently released Preliminary Plan to Restructure the Police, I would like to vehemently express my
disappointment and discomfort. Most of the plans recommendations include more funding to ICPD, which is exactly the
opposite of what the summer protests were about.
While funding crisis -oriented and mental health services and making sure calls are redirected this way is the way to go,
said funding for these programs should come from the current ICPD budget. They are actually going to be responding
to less calls, so, why would they need more (or even the same) funding? A lot of the proposals related to this in the
report include "close work with the ICPD," which I do not understand. Why should ICPD be involved at all in the
expansion of these services --specially when the report itself states the current officers inability to do so ("the Officers
filling these roles often do not have the time, resources, professional training, or language skills to effectively engage
with all segments of our population", p.46)?
The way forward is divesting from ICPD into other services:
■ https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-not-reform-its-
defunding-heres-why
• https://www.acIu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/defunding-the-police-will-actually-make-us-safer/
• httys://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/defund-the-police
That is, reduce ICPD's budget and use that budget to fund (independently from the police department) services and
entities that are better suited to improve the community.
Thank you for your time and attention,
Dr. Elisa Hernandez Perez
Kellie Fruehling
From: amy.charles <amy.charles@proton mai l.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 19, 2020 5:01 AM
To: Bruce Teague; Geoff Fruin
Cc: Laura Gray; Council
Subject: recommendations re police restructuring
A
R11K
Dear Bruce and Geoff,
I've watched Geoff's presentation, read the summary, and skimmed the full report and community comments, which I
will read with more care soon.
First, my overarching sense is of a project sliding away from what is and ought to remain its clear focus: racism, in
particular racism's effect on local policing. It is as though Geoff, and maybe council, are afraid to discuss the problem
with any vigor. I count 12 instances of the word "racism" in the entire 245 -page report, and some of those are in
footnote references and TOC headings; I count five instances of the word "Black" -- in the entire report -- that are not
part of an organization name. The recommendations are anxious to put the onus of anti -racism training on community
organizations, rather than institutionalizing anti -racism training within the City. I see no serious discussion of racism and
how to address it in policing in Iowa City. Nearly all the relevant remarks come from community members, not our City
Manager.
There is a reason the organization is called "Black Lives Matter" and not "Be More Careful With People who have Mental
Illnesses and Addictions", however important that second message is. I would like an explanation for why we are seeing
this shift in focus.
Second, while I am happy to applaud progress made, and I have no problem with paying taxes for more social services, I
am perplexed by Geoff's pleas for maintaining the size of the police force as it is. The rationales appear to be "other
comparable cities have more police" -- okay, that's them, not us -- and "we can't tell what kind of a call it'll be before we
get there, so it might be dangerous, so we have to treat every call as though it might be violent." Surely we have enough
experience, after decades of police calls, to have a reasonable sense of what kind of calls are extremely unlikely to be
violent. I scroll through the police activity log on a semi -regular basis and have done for over a decade. I have never seen
"chest pain" evolve into a violent call. Reports of burglaries after a student has been away: not violent calls. "Fireworks"
- stupid, but not violent. Frankly, a healthy proportion of the calls look nonviolent, and I don't see many that have
follow-up posts regarding backup or arrests. I can say from personal experience that having police show up for a non-
violent call in the expectation of violence is a powerful argument for not calling the police at all. I have written about this
before, but trying to de-escalate a situation in which a bunch of cops show up bound and determined to find an intruder
who doesn't exist is not an experience I ever want to go through again. If the police are concerned that the proliferation
of guns is making their job so dangerous that they feel they have to treat every type of human trouble as potentially
physically dangerous to them, then I have to ask why I haven't heard our Police Department being much more public in
advocacy of strong gun control. The last, closest note on that I can recall is Lonny, who isn't part of ICPD, coming out a
few years ago against loosening of mental-health restrictions on gun permits. Before that, I can recall a gun buyback of
some type maybe back in the aughts. Otherwise? Nothing, really. If it's a matter of deep concern within ICPD, I would
expect to hear much more from them on this.
If ICPD do share Geoff's view, then I would also like to know why their take is so far from almost everyone else's. I deal
with troubled, overwrought students all the time. I walk into classrooms in which there are mentally ill students,
students under very real and unbearable pressures. At least once a semester, I've never met these students before. I am
not armed, nor do I want to be armed. I fail to see how this would help. Other faculty routinely walk into lecture halls
where they'll teach hundreds of students, most of whom they'll never get to know, dealing with the same problems.
Hospital and social workers work with troubled strangers daily. We all deal with real human dramas, we all know that
now and then they become genuinely dangerous -- sometimes with little or no warning -- and yet we don't go in primed
for violence. Further, while I hear Geoff's idea about sending social -services professionals and police in teams to calls
that sound low-key, if we're going to do anything like that, it seems to me that the social services person ought to be
able to direct the situation, and that we should track the interactions: if it emerges that most of the time, the ride -along
cops are hanging out in the car while the social -services (or medical) person does the work, we should conclude that the
social/medical person does not need the bodyguard, and divert the resources to the social/medical programs. And if
that means fewer police -- terrific! We have a healthier society than we'd thought.
Geoff's final plea says: if we reduce the size of the police force, the remainder will burn out. I just am not seeing the
reasoning here. If our analysis shows that many of the calls police currently take are in fact best handled by
social/medical services, and that they do not need police riding along, then I don't see where the burnout comes from. A
significant responsibility, one for which they aren't trained, has been removed.
Finally, one of Geoff's recommendations is to hire a communications specialist that does not report to the Police
Department. I think that's an excellent idea. Rather than report to Geoff, however, I think this person should report to
Stefanie Bowers, thus ensuring that the focus in our policing shift remains on equity, anti -racism, human rights, and the
matters that caused a necessary eruption over policing last summer.
Sincerely,
Amy Charles
Iowa City
Kellie Fruehlin
From: Bruce Haupert <brucehaupert22@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2020 7:08 AM
To: Council
Attachments: Re: City seeks feedback on preliminary plan to accelerate community policing.eml;
ATT00001.htm
AS
Kellie Fruehling
From: Bruce Haupert <brucehaupert22@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 19, 2020 9:03 AM
To: CityoflowaCity@public.govdelivery.com
Subject: Re: City seeks feedback on preliminary plan to accelerate community policing
Just want you folks know that whomever puts together these emails with links so wonderfully plentiful and use made so
easy for the reader should get a huge raise. Those folks are the greatest. I am, with each use, thankful to whomever is
responsible for the product. Thank you, thank you. The entire website is terrific. Best of luck to you all.
On Dec 16, 2020, at 11:24 AM, City of Iowa City<CitvoflowaCity@public.govdelivery.com> wrote:
trouble viewing this email? View it as a Web page.
x
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: 12/16/2020
Contact: Geoff Fruin, City Manager
Phone: 319-356-5013
City releases preliminary plan to accelerate community
policing; seeks feedback from the public
On Tuesday, Dec. 15, 2020, the City of Iowa City released a preliminary plan to restructure the
Police Department towards community policing. The full preliminary plan is available on the City's
website at www.icgov.org/preliminarvr)lan.
The document includes a statistical overview of the Iowa City Police Department, background on
recent community policing initiatives, and 36 recommendations to address public health, community
safety, and systemic racism in Iowa City.
The 36 recommendations reflect three areas of focus: (1) a continuum of responses to crisis calls
for service including prevention, diversion, co -response, and stabilization and referrals; (2) a
commitment to unbiased policing; and (3) an effort to use unconventional and innovative solutions
for common problems.
The community is encouraged to provide additional input on the preliminary plan, to be incorporated
into the final plan. Residents can take a survey on the recommendations online or e-mail
suggestions to PolicePlan(a)-iowa-city.org.
Extensive public input was collected prior to the development of the preliminary plan, including six
listening posts on community policing held throughout the City. The preliminary plan comes after
City Council adopted a 17 -point resolution to address the Black Lives Matter movement and
systemic racism in June 2020. This resolution included a commitment to develop a preliminary plan
by December 15, 2020.
The public can view progress on other commitments and the full resolution at www.ic.gov.org/blm.
F-1
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sr 3�
SHAKE UP A PORT101V O OUR WORMS PROPOSAL
This proposal contains six sets of suggestions that could be pursued so that the Des
Moines Police Department is REFRAMED in lieu of being DEFUNDED. This arguably is
needed so that the percentage of Des Moines Residents whose skin tones are darker than
Residents with skin tones of beige (or eggshell, or ecru) who are harmed or killed by officers,
arrested, and imprisoned in Des Moines is no greater than their ratio is to the total population.
RACE iS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, with no scientific or DNA definitions. The DNA of most
Native Americans shows their Ancestry to be from the southern Pacific Ocean area. The word
"Caucasion" has its root in the Caucasus Mountain Range in Armenia. Natives of Sri Lanka with
skin tones of dark espresso coffee call themselves "Caucasians". The "African American" label
excludes dark skin toned people originating in such places as the Carribean, or Mayamar, or
Borneo. Brazilian official documents have no blank for "race"; instead there is a space for one
of thirty official skin "colors". The inaccuracy of labelling some humans "white" and some "black"
is easily proven. Use chalk to make a blob of white color and use a black magic marker to
make a blob of black color, and then try to find one healthy human that skin tone exactly
matches either color blob.
With the help of make-up artists, hair colorists, portrait photographers, watercolor and oil
portrait painters, a foldable laminated card with a spectrum of skin tones could be produced.
Groups of stakeholders would need to be involved in the naming of each skin tone of the
spectrum. This colored spectrum could be painted on the officers, batons. Use of the spectrum
of skin tones in -sought -Persons' descriptions would minimize "dragnet" types of pullovers and
searches; such being part of the object of eliminating racial profiting.
Even if we had an agreed upon spectrum of skin tones to refer to, accurate identification of
one person out of a group of choices is tricky. Scientific studies have established that people
that have skin hones close to beige more accurately identify people whose skin tones are close
to beige than do people whose skin tones are darker than the beige range. Likewise, people
who have skin tones darker than the beige tone range correctly identify people who have skin
tones darker than the beige range more often than do people whose skin tones are closer to the
color beige. Also at work in identification is a human need to please the authority person (if such
a person is liked). This translates into the person doing the identifying picking the doer of an act
that persona among his/her choices who closest resembles the one sought, rather or not it is the
exact person. The Innocence Project reports that 25% of innocent convicts released because of
the Project's efforts were identified in police stations andfor Court by victims and witnesses as
being the criminals.
Let's use this Reframing to adopt the Cadillac of Identification Protocol. Using a double blind
format (officers investigating are not card turners) and one-sided mugshot picture cards the size
of playing cards One card at a time is turned over to the photo side. The potential identifier
says either yes or no. If not identified the card is put in a pile with the blank side up. Then the
next card is turned over showing the picture side for the next "yes" or "no" response. Continue
1
through the deck. Thus no opportunity is given to the identifier to choose a person who most
closely matches the sought-after bad guy if the bad guy is not among the choices.
1. RESIDENTS' SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS
Simply put, what the Societal Interrupters of 2020-2021 seek is better police treatment and
less killings when their kin interact with Officers. Outlawing racial profiling and establishing a
Civilian Review Board are not bad things. They stili fail to modify bedrock police culture andfor
negative behaviors; if such were changed would benefit people of all skin tones and ethnic
groups.
The Stakeholder Residents are already doing that which they alone can do within their
families and subcommunities. An important truism is "positive behaviors result in positive
consequences", and the alternative, "negative behavior creates negative consequences".
Career choices and earning power are affected by bondability and governmental work
clearances, which in turn are affected by a criminal record. There can be no acceptability, no
matter how minor, of criminal behavior being a child's rite of passage to adulthood.
To get where the Residents want to go, they should add to what they are already doing the
following:
1. Emphasize that SEMANTICS (words) do matter. Train children that no words should come
out of their mouths that would embarrass their grandparents, and/or create a negative
impression toward them from those that hear the negative words..
2. Support the following activities so that "probable cause" scenarios are avoided:
A. Sponsor 4 times a year a "Change of Season Car Check" (tike the one @ yr. done now)
and there have top -off liquids and light bulbs needed by the vehicles' owners to
purchase at cost.
B. Help Officers design, distribute and place on your childrens' play guns colored, impos-
sible to remove, "PLAY GUN" labels that glow in the dark.
C. Design and distribute to motor vehicle owners laminated wallet sized cards which the
the owner of a car shows to each passenger as s/he starts to enter the vehicle. The
card directs the passenger to "place all weapons, cigarettes (if under 18 yrs.old), drugs,
and alcohol in the trunk before entering this vehicle. If this is a SW, van, or pick-up, the
locked box in the very back of the vehicle is what serves as the trunk.
3. Assist Officers in use of more accurate skirt tones designations so fewer "cattle -call" dragnets
occur when a darker skin toned suspect is being sought.
4. Give useful input on Officers' Academy training redesign.
5. Encourage children and young adults to participate in the "Young People Program".
6. Prepare and practice neutral phrases that can be chanted (some suggestions follow):
-Justice demands Equality not Disparity. ...
A brick in the hand is worth nothing to us.
-Looters go home, this is where we shop.
-idiots are not welcome here
ro
-Arsonists burn us, not them.
We need to be here now, join us.
2
Recognition is given that "change" is as stressful to those Officers being asked to change as is
"death". The foilowing changes' suggestions for Officers may:
- make their jobs easier,
- make them feel safer,
- eliminate the "us against them" mind set, and
- reduce the "been there, done that" and the "catch and release" scenarios that so
frustrate
by:
1. Adding the title "community peacekeeper" in a semicircle on top of present icon on the
car doors, the shirt sleeve fabric badges, hats, and stationary.
2 Eliminating militaristic structure by replacing hierarchical titles borrowed from the army
(sergeant, lieutenant, and caption ) and replacing them with the titles of "protecW or
"inspector" or "constable", followed by a number or roman numeral.
3. Demanding that at all times when an Officer is interacting with a Resident or a Visitor that the
Officer has a body camera going; with the one exception being exposed genitalia.
4. Training officers to commence any could -lead -to -an -arrest interaction by saying. "Do not
reach for anything, You can get a copy of my body camera tape for a reasonable fee tomorrow."
5. Composing a paragraph (like the Pledge of Allegiance) which the Officers read out loud in
unisom at the beginning of roll call. They can also use this paragraph to run thru their heads
silently, like a mantra, when exasperated by some Resident or Visitor. An example is provided
below.
"I am a community peacekeeper because of my desire to maintain the maxi-
mum amount of safety and happiness for the maximum number of people. 1
acknowledge that there are more good people than there are bad. But even
good residents can be involved in bad behaviors, just like bad people can be
motivated to do good. During all professional involvements, I seek to hinder
illegal activity rather than harming the doer."
6 Having the Command Structure constantly emphasize that SEMANTICS (words) do ratter
by having a written penalty for any Officer who directs insulting nouns, adjectives, or verbs at
Residents or Visitors. Harsh words are used exclusively to refer to behavior and not to -tie
person being questioned or arrested. Never are family members of the person bbing �
questioned or arrested to be denigrated.
7. Ceasing investing in armored vehicles and heavy weapons more appropriate for military
action than urban peacekeeping. fdeas follow on alternative goods that could be proc*d
with these funds instead:
3
A. Buy voice controlled portable computers so Officers can say their reports rather
than type them. This would most safely be done with a 2 person team with the
one not driving, talk the report. The computer should also contain an accident
template so the majority of an accident report can be entered by finger touch.
B. Buy audio volume measuring badges wearable on shirts to provide concrete
evidence supporting disturbing the peace arrests.
C. Buy weapons less lethal than guns, such as boomerangs, bolas, and rope lassos
to stop fleers without shooting them.
D. Equip squad cars with what could be called "half -shields" which would protect
Officers from knives brandished by potential "suicide by cop" seekers.
E. Design a stationary -sized poster demonstrating the darkest car window film that
is legal and distribute the posters to installers and sellers of such films.
F. Redo arrest reports by adding at the bottom a box that an office can check if s/he
wants a say in sentencing.
111. OFFICERS' INTERACTION$ WITH RESIDENTS AND VISITORS
1. At most community gatherings, there should be a functioning dunk tank with both the
operators and dunkees being Officers.
2. At most community gatherings, there should be a portable dodgeball field in which teams of
Officers compete against Residents. The edges of the playing stage can be composed of
stand-alone cattle fence panels with sandbags supporting them so they stay vertical.
3. Officers perform marching drill performances, but in lieu of bayonets, they are armed with
mops and brooms, or rakes and hoes, or spades and shovels, or snow shovels and ice
choppers.
4. The command structure should encourage Officers' involvement with the below Young
People's Group outlined on page seven -eight.
5. Make available to Residents training for their dogs so that the dogs become vicious when a
house is invaded and/or (upon command) when a Resident is attacked. Contrary to popular
belief, dogs do not instinctively do these things.
_4
1 'Iv c rg
L i�l; 1! 14
1. Repeal city ordinances criminalizing possession of drug paraphernalia.
2. Assure that the odor of smoked marijuana in a car or on a person, along with slurred speech
and eyes' appearance, does not equal "probable cause". The foregoing shall continue to be
one acceptable component of an identification which can lead to an arrest.
3. Expand the City Ordinance on "Interfering With Official Acts, to include recording or
attempting to record or take photos within 10 feet of an Officer questioning or arresting a
Resident or Visitor.
4. Assure that the present ordinance on acceptable darkness of car windows darkening film is
such that it allows Officers' to see guns -in -hand of a back seat passenger.
S. Pass an Ordinance that states that NO civil rights, tort, or contract settlement or judgment
involving taxpayer money, including the use of taxpayer money to purchase insurance
coverage, shall be confidential.
fi. Pass legislation requiring all tapes, pictures, or videos used to attempt to prove or suggest
any action of an Officer bear a specific icon if:
a. an inanimate items, animals, person, or background,
b. length, or
c. audio
has been edited, shortened, or in any other way manipulated.
7. Pass legislation that allows Judges to do creative sentencing which would recognize that
beyond the specific victim, the community is also a victim. Both community representatives and
arresting officers' input is to be invited and considered.
8. Pass legislation for a Pilot Program that allows a motorized vehicle used in any of the below
crimes be at the time of arrest BOOTED (for different amounts of time) for:
a. anyone in the car has or had an unregistered gun
b. gun discharged within city limit
c. potential lethal weapon used to threaten or harass
d. having too dark window film
e. being driven by a driver without a license
f. lacking Liability insurance
g. being driven by a driver whose license is suspended
h. being driven by a driver whose license is revoked
i. having a driver who gets arrested for OMVI or being stoned
j. having within the car a volume of illegal drugs that result in an aggravated
misdemeanor or higher level charge
The BOOT 'EM PROGRAM should be advertised on Billboards, Buses, and Bus Benches.
5
V. REVISE ACADEMY TRAINING
1. Use local professors of Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, English, Rhetoric, Linguistic,
Human Relations, Anatomy, and Life Drawing to teach:
-recognition of bias and effective techniques to minimize irs negative effects
-logic
-persuasion
-motivation,
-nonverbal communication
-crowd dynamics and control
-deescalation
-proportionality
-use of humor
-human reaction of freeze, flee, or fight to scary situation
-avoidance of suicide by cop
write more specific descriptions using what learned in Life Drawing classes
2. Have training session with treatment personnel on best way to have positive outcomes
dealing with:
-a domestic upsert siruarion
-a drunk
-person having a mental health crisis
3. Create, with Stakeholders input, a Scale of Aggression directing officers on when and what
officers' actions are optimal during various scenarios, such as:
a. a Resident's refusal to present id
b. a Resident's refusal to answer other questions
c. a Resident's failure to follow directions
d. hostile Resident's behavior while approaching Officer
e. fleeing on foot
f. fleeing on a bike "
g. fleeing on a cycle !,
h. fleeing in a car.
i. when a Resident has a gun or knife in his or her hand
while protecting the lives of the Officer, Resident, and Visitor.
4. increase types of available weapons (e.g. boomerangs, bolos, rope lassos) and training of
their use with emphasis on when to use each as specified on the Scale of Aggression.
5. Emphasize throughout the Training that a well done job is to hinder the illegally behaving
Resident and his or her bad behavior, not to kill him or her.
0
6. Analyze gun training to determine why when an officer fires his or her weapon an overfill
occurs, meaning multiple bullets fired, when one bullet would have strapped the Resident. If
appropriate, train to avoid multiple bullets fired.
The above additions to the curriculum increase the Academy's length and extend the time
before new recruits can be put on the streets. Address this by swearing the recruits in at the
end of the same period of time that the unrevised Academy would have taken as Provisional
Officers. Going forward, schedule each officer's weekly for a four day street tour and one day at
the Academy until all the above expanded training areas are covered, and then they become
full-fledged Officers.
Many ethnic groups have rites of passage separating adulthood from childhood and/or
membership in subgroups. Native American tribes required their boys to endure strenuous
situations before being deemed warriors. Jews have Bar Mitzvahs and Bah Mitzvahs.
Hispanics have Quinceaneras. Fraternities and Sororities have their pledge and initiation
activities. It appears that humans like being part of small subgroups. Allegedly part of the
attraction of gang membership is being part of a subgroup with required actions for
membership. Officers could provide an alternative organization. One idea for a name is
FOURSCORE AND THEN SOME; opened to every city Resident from the ages of 13 yrs old to
26 yrs. old (which is the upper limit of kids' insurance coverage on their parents' medical
insurance and the age it can take for the male brain to finish maturing)..
There would be a list of Talents that would have to be acquired before a member qualified for
spectacular adventures. Examples: white water rafting, boundary water camping trip, pioneer
covered wagon trip, a dude ranch stay, Pikes Peak's climb, Appalachian Trail hike, swimming
with Manatees, deer or quail hunting, or attending pro sports games.
Proof of attainment of a talent would be evidenced by awarding personalized playing cards.
Earning specific cards would be required prior to participation in an adventure. Some of the
talents could be
1. Memorizing and reciting the 183 words of the Gettysburg Address
2. Passing a timed quiz using a map upon which is named Africa's 53 countries
3. Perfecting swimming drills up through earning a Lifeguard Certificate
4. Learning to use a canoe and a kayak
5. Meeting the physical requirements of the Fire Department
6. Getting a driver's license, when age appropriate; later get a license for larger vans
7. Completing a Survivalist Course
8. Learning First Aid
9. Learning Morse Code and demonstrating proficiency
10. Preparing a weekend menu of camping meals and prepare such meals
11. Learning 5 bird calls, which can include game birds
7
12. Leaming to catch fish, clean, and fillet; or kill, pluck & debone a fowl
13. Helping stock fish in lakes and rivers
14. Hunting and field dress a deer
15. Assisting in the removal of invasive (non-native) animals and plants.
16. Being responsible for keeping a given area of river banks free of trash
17. Working to assure maximum insects/birdslanimals migration
18. Studying outdoor photography so photo hunts happen.
19. Knitting or crocheting a snatching hat and scarf
20. Demonstrating proficiency of both fixing and installing a zipper
21. Sewing on a button, sewing up a rip, and laming a sock
22. Composing a cadence or designing choreography of a drill team
23. Assisting the directing of parking during State Fair, Parades, Concerts, and Festivals
24. Assisting Officers bring/set-up/runitear down Dunk Tank and Dodgeball Field
25. Enrolling opponents and keeping score at dodgeball games and drill teams competitions
26. Leaming to read music and play a simple song on a keyboard
27. Playing a simple song on a harmonica
28. Being involved in [Neighborhood Associations and other Community Organizations
29. Writing an editorial that gets published
30. Speaking at a governmental council/.boardlagency in support or resistance of a position
31. Helping with Habitat for Humanity construction
32. Volunteering a given number of hours for the City PaWs Department
33. Volunteering a given amount of hours at the City's Pound
34. Volunteering to be the feet of users` who can't get and return library goods
35. Being involved with religious groups and activities (beyond attending services)
36. Walking dogs/wash cars/mow yards/shovel snow for challenged -mobility Residents
Other ideas are welcome.
Respectfully,
Donna Ruth Beary
donnabealyAgol.com
(515) 243-4627
•7
8
'7
Kellie Fruehling
From: David Drustrup <david.drustrup@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 1, 2021 4:23 PM
To: Geoff Fruin; Council, Bruce Teague; John Thomas; Laura Bergus; Mazahir Salih; Susan
Mims; Pauline Taylor; Janice Weiner; PolicePlan
Subject: Response to proposed police changes Late Handouts Distributed
RISK
Dear City Manager and City Councilors,
1 —`f-21
(Date)
In Geoff Fruin's June 10 letter to the city, he started by saying "The world changed on May 25, 2020 when
George Floyd was murdered..." The world had not actually changed. The state's abuse of Black people is one
of the most fundamentally consistent practices in the country's history. What he should have said was "On May
25, 1 started paying attention to racism in a new way." While this shouldn't be a new topic, it's far preferable for
our city officials to admit that they don't yet understand a complex social topic like race and policing.
Unfortunately, the proposed plan for changes to policing in Iowa City is a dangerous assumption of knowledge
about a complex topic. It proposes changes that will move us backwards. I understand that the city is
uninterested in the opinions or professionalism of IFR at this point, despite the fact that many of us have paid
attention and studied these social topics years before George Floyd's name was widely known. However, the
city manager's proposal ignores the most basic, introductory critical analysis of policing and safety. Even if the
majority of Council continues to be uninterested in using IFR as a source of knowledge, please consult other
professionals who have thought critically about this topic. I've encouraged Council several times to contact Dr.
Simon Balto, who is a historian and professor in African American Studies at the University of Iowa and
recently published a book about the history of policing in Chicago. What is the harm in simply running the
proposal by him and paying him for an hour of his time? You have professionals in your backyard who you are
not listening to.
If you continue to center the voices of Iowa City social groups who you already know mostly agree with the
status quo, then why are we spending time exploring new ideas? Why did we do those listening posts if the
majority of input didn't show up in the proposal? I was at every listening event and read every letter sent in that
was published in the packet. At worst, IFR and their supporters represented more than half of the public
opinion, and certainly well over half during the in-person events, despite the fact that the groups you invited
were groups who already partner with and support police. So, why did you ask us to invest our time in that if
our voices aren't represented? It should be no surprise that young people are not excited about becoming
politically involved. Even fairly liberal governing bodies leave us out of the conversation or write us off as too
extreme, despite being widely represented in the feedback you solicited.
Now, to the proposal for policing changes itself. I felt extremely disheartened reading this, not just because it
doesn't address things that we worked so hard to bring to the table as IFR, but because the majority of these
proposals move us backwards. City Manager Fruin is proposing an expansion of police power in many ways.
First, he is proposing that the police increase their influence in the community by adding or strengthening
partnerships with local organizations (#2, 5, 9, 13, 14, 17, 23, 24, 31, 32). These proposals suggest that a
problem with our local community organizations has nothing to do with inadequate funding, but instead that
they are not sufficiently connected with the agency that is principally trained in the use of force and order
maintenance.
The proposal also attempts to add and/or validate several positions for cops in civilian clothing (#2, 3, 7, 14).
These and others also seek to add more positions to the city government, whose close ties to the police only
place these positions under police influence. This strategy suggests that the problem with policing is that it is
not vast or multifaceted enough. But why would we employ and train people to do outreach and community -
focused work within the police department and city government, when we already have perfectly capable local
organizations to do this? We do not need more power within the police department, regardless of what type of
uniform they wear. We need to trust and empower the most vulnerable citizens of our city through resources
that don't come from the department of badges and guns.
The City Manager also ignores the structural, systemic nature of harmful policing by suggesting that all we
need are more conversations or kinder forms of policing (#g, 20, 23, 24, 34, 35, 36). These ignore any analysis
of systemic racism, which must include the root causes of why police have been historically harmful to
vulnerable communities. If more conversations and unbiased police were all that was needed, then the past 60
years of police reforms in this country would have already worked. Finally, the focus on training is another
staple of past police reform failures (#10, 12, 15, 16, 17). The City Manager is ignoring the fact that increased
training is what got us here, and that training does not get to the systemic roots of police violence. Training
adds resources and legitimacy to police, without changing the fact of their discretion to use violence and whom
they get to apply the law to --the true root causes of systemic police harm.
These are only the beginnings of the failures in this proposal. Proposal #6 has potential to affect systemic
change if it replaces police response. Proposal #8 has potential if we can somehow be sure that the police do
not have the ability to use footage to harm the most vulnerable populations. Maybe this can be done by
creating a separate entity aside from the police department that works with traffic camera enforcement.
Councilor Thomas's work in this space has seemed conscious and respectful towards the policy's implications
for racial justice, and I believe his continued efforts should be taken seriously as an important avenue for
systemic change.
I understand that you see this as "a starting point." But this is a deeply dangerous place to start because the
starting place for your negotiations is a site of great harm that has failed time and time again in this country.
You are starting from a place that does not challenge the status quo: you are adding power and money to the
police department. It starts from a place that has produced nothing but increased legitimacy of the police
alongside stagnant or worsening results for racial disparities in involvement with the legal system. We cannot
afford for the city to choose to ignore the history of police reform as they implement changes. If you need
support in finding the resources to critically examine the changes you're proposing, please let us know. It's
alright not to be experts, but it is not alright to pretend that you understand complex social topics while
proposing things that have been proven to fail, meanwhile your most vulnerable citizens suffer while you and I
are left unaffected.
City Manager Fruin started his presentation by offering Iowa City as a leader in change. There is no leadership
in a proposal that so severely lacks historical consciousness that it looks like a playlist of this country's past six
decades of failed neoliberal proposals: adding funding to the police department while expanding police
influence using neoliberal jargon about "community outreach" and increased training. This proposal must be
scrapped and started again with an honest acknowledgement of the history of police reform.
David Drustrup
David Drustrup, M.A.
Pronouns: He/Him/His
Doctoral Candidate, Counseling Psychology
University of Iowa
david.drustrupOgmail. com
Kellie Fruehl
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Ashlee Johannes <johannesash@gmail.com>
Sunday, January 3, 20212:54 PM
Council
RESTRUCTURING THE IOWA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
(Date)
� j I
-LA-Z1
I am writing to say this proposal is highly offensive. The fight and advocacy was for more resources being
transferred to our critical social and relief organizations within our area supporting homeless, youth, domestic
violence, and more who are skilled at their specific mission. Do not force them to team up with cops. Do not
force them to compromise on their core principles. Above all, give our community more respect by filling the
pockets of these local, strong organizations that have been taking care of us for decades.
Reconsider your recommendations to better align with what the community advocated for this past summer
and years before.
Ashlee Johannes
Iowa City Citizen of io years
This email is from an external source.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Rod Sullivan: Local Option Sales Tax
Item Number: 8.c.
Kellie Fruehling
From: Rod Sullivan <rodsullivan29@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2020 6:36 PM
To: Council
Subject: Local Option Sales Tax
RISK
December 15, 2020
Dear Iowa City Council:
I was excited to sit down and read your plan for reimagining the way Iowa City does policing.
Then I saw that the very first point was to push for a Local Option Sales Tax (LOST). So instead
of an evening full of positive possibilities, I am left once again to petition my government on
behalf of the principle of economic justice.
I remain opposed to increasing the sales tax. Sales taxes are better for the rich, and worse for
the poor. This is because sales taxes are more regressive than property taxes.
What is regressivity? This means that the poor pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes
than do the wealthy. Sales taxes are the most regressive taxes. Income taxes are the most
progressive taxes.
A person with an income of $90,000 paid 3.2% of her income in taxes. A person earning
$19,500 paid 11.1% of her income in taxes. Relative to income, the poor pay more than twice
what the middle class pay, and nearly 5 times the amount the wealthy pay. Even with
exemptions, sales taxes hit the poor hardest.
So who are the poor? Most of the people living in poverty in Iowa and elsewhere are children.
There are more poor women than poor men. 15% (105,000) of the children in Iowa live in
poverty. Even more (42%) live in low-income families. Taken together, over half our children are
poor. Sales taxes hurt them the most.
I
So who benefits? The biggest property taxpayers in Johnson County will benefit the most. That
includes: Coral Ridge Mall, Mid American, Hawk Landlord LLC, ACT, Green State Credit Union,
and the Graduate Hotel. They benefit the most. Is that really what we want to do? Cut taxes on
those businesses, and shift the cost to poor kids? We would be LITERALLY taking money from
people on Social Security, and using it to buy down the taxes of those corporations. Not very
New Deal, if you ask me.
People like to talk about all the big things we could do with a sales tax. But we could do them
right now with an increase in the property tax. That is correct. We can do it all with property
taxes. Iowa City ranks #100 in property tax rate among Iowa's cities at $40.77. That is lower
than Des Moines, West Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, Davenport, and many other cities. Iowa City
could do the things they want to do by simply raising property taxes.
Look at the language being used. The sales tax is "an opportunity we can't pass up" and "leaving
money on the table." Why isn't a property tax increase viewed as "an opportunity we can't pass
up" and "leaving money on the table?" I will tell you why. Local officials are afraid to ask the
wealthy to pay more. It is much easier to dump your trouble on the poor.
This is just a matter of political will. Elected officials are afraid to ask the people with the actual
money to pay more. So they squeeze the poor, who by and large don't show up at Council
meetings. If the project is so important, just do it with property tax dollars.
People talk about being "visionary". Where is the vision that makes things better for the poor? If
we cannot collectively get past the idea that we don't want to piss off a few local rich people?
Then we aren't a group whose "vision" deserves a vote.
You cannot raise money for public projects on the backs of the poor and pretend they will be
unaffected. The needs of the poor will outpace any and all services that they have helped to
fund. Governmental agencies should not improve their budget situations on the backs of the
poorest of the poor. In Johnson County, parents and kids at Twain, Kirkwood, and Hills will put
more of their income toward a sales tax than parents and kids at Wickham, Lincoln, and Shimek.
Does this make sense?
Another problem with the sales tax is that services used solely by wealthy people tend not to be
taxed. The services of accountants, attorneys, and stockbrokers are not subject to sales taxes.
These and many other services (advertising, consulting, etc.) used primarily by the wealthy and
by corporations go untaxed.
2
Sales tax proponents frequently use the argument, "Sales taxes are better than property taxes."
First off, this is demonstrably untrue. But even if it was true, this argument is akin to saying,
"Drinking is better than smoking, so we need more drinking." Neither tax option is good for the
poor. But sales taxes are worse.
Some folks are under the impression that renters do not pay property taxes. While it is true they
do not pay them directly, renters are definitely covering the landlord's property taxes!
Assuming there is a demand, landlords will raise rents, regardless of taxes. They try to squeeze
out maximum profit. This is supply and demand and will happen REGARDLESS of taxes.
Another flaw in this argument is assuming that landlords are somehow entitled to no less profit
than they are currently receiving. Supply and demand drives the rental market - nothing else.
This is a fact, and economists of all stripes have backed this up.
One argument sales tax proponents often make is that "outsiders" will help pay the tax. People
who live outside of Johnson County will pay about 20-25% of the taxes collected. These are by
and large not people from Chicago, however, but commuters who purchase goods on the way
home.
I cannot, in good conscience, support a shift of the tax burden to people who have less money.
What's more, I have trouble saying that a person earning $25,000 should pay more tax just
because she lives in Williamsburg, Riverside, West Branch, etc. Especially when the local wealthy
would be let off the hook at her expense. It is critically important that we think of our middle
and low-income neighbors who commute to this County.
Republicans in the Iowa Legislature made the sales tax even worse a couple years ago, and
pretty much impossible for me to support. At that time they required that at least 500/0 of any
sales tax goes toward property tax relief. GOP Legislators pretty much could not have been more
intentional in screwing the poor.
There are several theological arguments against increasing the sales tax. I just happen to buy
into a worldview that those who are able need to help those who are not. It is a basic organizing
principle of any society, for one thing. Most major world religions subscribe to the idea of helping
the poor.
3
"The last shall be first and the first shall be last"; "Do unto others"; and "A rich man has a better
chance of putting a camel through the eye of a needle than getting into Heaven." Each of these
argues against putting a greater tax burden on the poor. Let's follow this lead rather than doing
more to comfort the comfortable.
Frankly, I am REALLY tired of wealthy people saying that sales taxes "aren't that regressive."
Easy for you to say as you vote to cut your own taxes at the expense of our poorest residents!
And repeating your false claim over and over does not make it true. This argument is shameful,
really.
Let's be clear. The people who are bringing this up are not bad. They just want to see good
things happen. I simply think they are falling into an all -too -common trap. An extra 5, 10, or 20
dollars does not sound like much to proponents. Because it is NOT much to proponents.
We are just all SO scared to ask the people with the most resources to pay for things. If that
fear continues to be greater than the desire to do these projects, then the projects should not
get done. Because our leaders lack the political will to do so.
The community has needs. I think we should discuss addressing those needs. But let's not do it
on the backs of the poor!
Want $4 million more for social services agencies? Raise property taxes. You have the ability to
do so right now. If it is more important to them than Coral Ridge Mall, MidAmerican, and Green
State, they can just do it.
Bottom line? The sales tax sucks. And it sucks more the poorer you are. And opposing it is in
keeping with New Deal politics.
Please do not pursue this unjust measure.
Sincerely,
4
Rod Sullivan
2326 E. Court St.
Iowa City, IA 52245
319-354-7199
Item Number: 8.d.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Op Madera:Reform Ideas for Iowa City Planning, Housing, and Governance
Kellie Fruehlin
From: Op Madera <reformingplanningandzoning@outlook.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2020 6:50 PM
To: Council
Cc: Darian Nagle-Gamm; Brianna Gabel; Kent Ralston; Anne Russett; Stefanie Bowers;
Wendy Ford; jlundell@coralville.org
Subject: Reform Ideas for Iowa City Planning, Housing, and Governance
Attachments: We sent you safe versions of your files; Reforming American Transportation and
Zoning.pdf; Reforming American Housing Policy.pdf, Reforming American Metropolitan
Governance.pdf
I
R11K
Mimecast Attachment Protection has deemed this file to be safe, but always exercise caution when opening files.
Greetings!
I hope this finds you well. I wanted to highlight some reforms that I think could be key to keeping Iowa City
and the broader region affordable, efficient, and equitable.
Upzoning, Missing Middle housing and Accessory Dwelling Units are becoming more popular across the United States
and Canada. Some examples of proposed and enacted reforms include:
The State or Oregon
The City
of Portland, OR
The State of Washington
The State of California (AB68, SB50, SB902)
The City
The City
of Minneapolis, MN (Notes of caution)
of Vancouver, CAN (Lanewav Houses)
The State of Vermont
The City
of Edmonton, CAN
The State of Nebraska
The County of Montgomery, MD
The State of Maryland
The City
of Madison, WI
The State of Virginia
of Sandpoint, ID
• Many others
The State of Minnesota
Additionally, some jurisdictions have altered other related regulations such as FAR, minimum lot size, and parking
restrictions that would otherwise implicitly bar Missing Middle Housing. These regulations can implicitly bar Missing
Middle Housing by rendering certain types of real estate projects financially infeasible. Off-street parking requirements
in particular can significantly increase the construction costs of a project per unit. Some examples of jurisdictions that
have enacted changes to these related regulations in parts or all of their jurisdiction include:
• The City
of Houston, TX (Note, Houston does have de -facto zoning restrictions)
• The City
of San Francisco, CA
■ The City
of Buffalo, NY
• The City
of Hartford, CT
• The City
of Minneapolis, MN
■ The City
of Sacramento, CA
• The City
of San Diego, CA
• The City
of Sandpoint, ID
• Many others
To craft effective land use regulations that allow Missing Middle Housing, a jurisdiction must consider both explicit (use
restrictions, unit restrictions, etc.) and implicit (parking requirements, density restrictions, setback requirements, etc.)
legal hurdles to such real estate projects. Legalizing small live -work units and smaller mixed-use buildings can also allow
for small business and economic development.
Lastly, the attached issue briefs might help solve some of the transportation, housing, and governance challenges Iowa
City faces. These proposed reforms are focused on sustainability, equity, and efficiency.
Thank you so much for your time and consideration, and I hope some of these ideas are useful in making Iowa City the
best place it can be!
Op Madera
P.S. I would very much appreciate a confirmation that this email went through.
Greetings transportation planners and policymakers,
Are you a fiscal conservative who wants to lower the overall cost of our infrastructure? Are you a liberal
who cares deeply about climate change and environmental sustainability? Are you a libertarian who
believes governments should work to maximize freedom? What if we told you there was a set of policy
changes that could do all of those things?
If you live in the United States, there is a single performance metric that shapes your life in ways you
probably never realized, shaping the places that you live, and deciding what mobility options you will
have. This performance metric is called "level -of -service," or LOS. LOS is a relatively straightforward
metric that grades roadway facilities with letters A through F depending on the amount of peak period
vehicle delay. A simple example is illustrated in the table below.
Level of Service Delay (seconds
-
0-10
_
11-15
11-20
C
21-35
D
36-55
E
56-80
>50
>80
Delay (seconds/vehicle) j Traffic Flow
0-10
Free flow
_
11-15
Reasonably free flow
16-25
Stable flow
26-35
Approaching unstable flow
36-50
Unstable Flow
>50
Flow breakdown
Traffic engineers often use LOS to understand where congestion is occurring on roadway networks to
assist them in planning and prioritizing capacity expansion projects or other congestion mitigation plans.
Urban planners often use LOS to understand the impacts of new development, changes to
comprehensive city plans, new specific plan re -zonings, or other land use plans and regulations on the
existing roadway network.
In many states, analyzing the environmental impact of a transportation project also includes looking at
LOS impacts. This is due to the U-shaped curve for many emissions per mile as a relationship to travel
speed. Generally, an increase in travel speed beyond very low speeds tends to decrease emissions per
mile, which then begin to climb up again at higher speeds (with the specific relationship depending on
the engine, vehicle, and roadway characteristics). Thus, many traffic engineers deduce that congestion is
also the cause of added air quality problems and greenhouse gas emissions, and strive to ensure cars
can move relatively quickly and unhindered. Though the federal government does not require it, LOS has
often been used to measure the environmental impact of transportation projects.
But there's an underlying problem with LOS, or at least a problem with the common uses of and implicit
messages sent by LOS. One of the major problems is on the economic side. The economic problem with
LOS is that it generally fails to consider the concept of latent and induced demand. You can understand
this concept quite simply as "if something is made cheaper, people will do or consume more of it." LOS
is an intrinsically engineering -based approach that often leads traffic engineers to propose capacity
expansion as the main method to cut down on congestion. Unfortunately, capacity expansion,
particularly in the context of metropolitan freeways and arterials, unleashes latent demand (people
make more trips) in the short term and causes induced demand in the long term (because the new
roadway capacity causes redistribution of metropolitan -area growth from the core to the periphery).
Now, not all "induced demand" is inherently bad, freeway capacity expansions can provide additional
mobility and give people more choices on where to live, shop, and work (keyword, "can," not necessarily
will). However, it also means that the congestion -mitigation impacts of capacity expansion are likely to
be vastly overstated, and that such capacity expansions are likely to increase overall vehicle -miles
traveled, as well as any negative externalities associated with higher vehicle miles traveled such as air
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, while the traffic engineers correctly point out that
increasing speeds from very low to mid-range will reduce emissions per mile, the analyses will often fail
to account for the additional emissions from the higher vehicle miles traveled (VMT) induced by the
capacity expansion project (sometimes referred to as "VMT-clawback"). In effect, roadway capacity
expansion can fail to meaningfully reduce congestion in the long term while adding to regional air
quality problems, increasing overall greenhouse gas emissions, and leaving behind ever increasing
amounts of infrastructure and pavement that will ultimately need to be maintained with tax dollars (and
we'll take this opportunity to note that less than half of all roadway expenditures in the U.S. are paid for
by user fees, as noted in Exhibit 6-1 here).
Capacity expansions on major freeways have other effects, as they put economic and political pressure
on exurban jurisdictions to zone for additional fringe development. While some jurisdictions charge
developers impact fees to build the new local roads and infrastructure for this new development, many
do not, and oftentimes the financial responsibility for long-term O&M will still fall on public works
departments even if there are impact fees for initial development. Furthermore, fringe development will
often increase congestion on networks downstream and in other jurisdictions, causing the local
jurisdiction or neighboring jurisdictions to expend additional resources to expand their own roadway
capacity, with such costs not being internalized by the development creating the impact. Local
jurisdictions may not always internalize these costs either, as transportation funding is often transferred
to them from higher levels of government and taxpayers in other jurisdictions, meaning that said
jurisdictions will likely allow fringe development beyond what is economically efficient because they
don't bear the full tax burden of the long-term infrastructure impacts of their decisions.
The other major issues with LOS are philosophical and practical. The implicit philosophical message sent
by focusing on LOS alone is that the primary goal of a transportation network is to "move more cars
faster." While doing so can have benefits, it can also have important drawbacks that LOS often fails to
capture. Additional urban freeways can separate communities and destroy the urban fabric that knits
neighborhoods together, making local travel by walking more difficult and circuitous while lowering the
quality of life in freeway -adjacent neighborhoods due to air and noise pollution. For commercial
property owners whose businesses rely on foot traffic from local neighborhoods, or residential property
owners whose tenants rely on walking for local goods, services, or to access jobs, it can end up harming
local property values due to the lowering of the accessibility of said properties to their own walk shed. A
heavier reliance on cars instead of walking can further incentivize the erosion of the urban fabric and
the proliferation of surface parking lots or parking structures, or even incentivize local governments to
require parking minimums, all of which often create large "dead -zones" that hamper the quality of the
walking environment. What's more, the focus on automobile delay often comes at the expense of other
modes, as anything that hinders the movement of automobiles is seen as a negative. Traffic engineers
and planners, guided by LOS, often end up removing crosswalks or never installing them in the first
place. Furthermore, guided by LOS, traffic impact "mitigations" charged to new developments often
involve roadway capacity expansions, intersection grade -separations, narrowing sidewalks for more
travel or turn lanes, or other "improvements" that degrade mobility for pedestrians.
As such, we have some of the major problems with LOS: (1) it makes infill development look bad
because infill development loads traffic onto a congested network, even if infill loads substantially less
VMT per capita onto the network; (2) it uses an analysis scale that is often too small and focused on
local impacts to congestion instead of regional reduction in VMT; (3) it often includes mitigations that
exacerbate the problem, such as pushing development to the metropolitan fringes and roadway
widenings that induce more VMT; (4) it implicitly views pedestrian, biking, and transit improvements as
a negative because they might obstruct cars even if such improvements can increase person -throughput
in a corridor; and (5) it focuses on minimizing vehicle delay instead of maximizing access to destinations,
and these might not always be equivalent. In response to these and other concerns about LOS, some
states and local jurisdictions are taking a harder look at alternatives. California is changing the long-
standing practice of estimating environmental impacts of transportation and zoning decisions from LOS
to another metric, VMT. The
California Office of Planning and
Research found that measuring
VMT, instead of vehicle delay, more
accurately captures the
environmental impacts of different
development, zoning, and
transportation choices than LOS,
while providing other benefits as
well.
Aside from aiding more informed decision-making when it comes to transportation planning, assessing
VMT impacts can also lead to more efficient decision-making on zoning issues. Strict zoning regulations
that explicitly, through height, FAR, density, and bulk restrictions, or implicitly, through other
requirements such as parking minimums that can make infill development financially unviable, have
been blamed for the rapidly increasing housing crisis in major U.S. metropolitan areas. Zoning
restrictions also often prevent increases in density, forcing more development and growth from existing
urban neighborhoods (with existing infrastructure) to the exurban fringe. Sometimes zoning restrictions
are defended using the framework of LOS, arguing that density should not be allowed to go beyond
what the roadway network can support without peak period delays. However, this ultimately leads to
higher infrastructure needs, vehicle miles traveled, and energy use per capita, and thus creates higher
criteria pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions, and tax burdens per capita. Additionally, the added costs of
parking and maintaining additional infrastructure for telecommunications, water lines, and other utility
lines are ultimately passed on to consumers by private companies and utilities as a hidden tax.
Strict zoning regulations are a limitation on individual property rights, and prevent property owners
from using their property for its highest and best use. When zoning restrictions are onerous, often the
only "up -zonings," or the acts of allowing additional development on a given parcel of land, are given to
politically connected and large developers, effectively shutting smaller developers and businesses out of
the market. Zoning restrictions prevent more supply from being created in areas with increasing
demand, artificially driving down rental vacancy rates and for -sale housing supplies, which in turn drive
up rents and house prices, leading to increased gentrification and displacement.
ANTWAKFORTNLNONO Additionally, the induced suburban sprawl created by
_ TO as WI"MMI � � -
freeway investments combined with forced suburban sprawl
created by strict zoning regimes harms public transportation
- viability. First, for coverage -focused modes like buses, the
modes must travel farther and through less dense areas,
sacrificing ridership and revenue while driving up operating
costs. Second, for throughput -focused modes such as bus -
rapid transit, light rail and heavy rail (notice streetcars are not
included), zoning restrictions prevent residents and
businesses (and the employees who would work at those
businesses) from locating in the walkshed of mass
transportation stops. This reduces transit agency ridership and revenue, decreasing farebox recovery
ratios, and thus leaves additional subsidies to be borne by taxpayers while devaluing major public
investments in mass transit. All of this also drives up costs for companies to hire workers due to
increased commuting costs and increased housing prices, another hidden tax on businesses.
Given these and other issues with strict local land use regulation, local jurisdictions, state legislatures,
and the federal government should consider whether zoning reform is needed, as many states are in the
process of doing, such as S.B. 50 in California. Other countries may also offer additional lessons. While
there may be no singular one -size fits all approach, every bit of work on this issue by states and other
countries offer lessons and ideas for improving transportation, housing, environmental, and fiscal policy.
Those who argue the current built environment is the free market at work should ask themselves some
tough questions (and before you start bringing up Houston as proof that sprawl is the free market, here
is something you should read first). It's difficult to argue that government -planned, financed,
engineered, constructed, policed, plowed, salted and maintained roadways are truly the free market at
work. Similarly, zoning regulations that require minimum amounts of parking or substantially restrict
density are far from laissez-faire. This is not to say government intervention to construct and maintain
roadways is a bad thing, or that all zoning regulations are inherently bad, it is just to say these things
should not disguise themselves as the "free market," and represent market distortions that require
justification for their existence and public conversations about what the appropriate level of
intervention should be.
If you explored the links during this journey you've ended up hearing from academics, think tanks,
government agencies, free market conservatives, environmentally- and socially -conscious liberals, anti -
regulation libertarians, housing advocates, radical socialist video creators, bloggers, urban planners and
engineers. They raise important questions about the policies that have shaped the places we live and
the way in which we live in those places, often to an incalculable degree. Many of them ask whether
those policies are actually leading to the creation of places we want to live in or the results we'd like to
see, and beg the question of whether or not it is time to reexamine or alter those policies. The point of
this was not to pretend we have all the answers, but to get people asking the right questions. We hope
this small piece here goes on to become part of the broader change towards a more efficient,
sustainable, and equitable society.
Thank you for your time, we hope you found this interesting and that you'll share this, or the ideas
contained within it, with anyone that you think may find it a worthwhile read. Remember, each and
every one of us, even doing something small, can make a big difference. That change begins with you.
Greetings urban planners and policymakers,
In the 1950-1970s, investments in grade separated freeway infrastructure and urban renewal hollowed
out major American cities, particularly their urban cores and core -adjacent neighborhoods. This
occurred through direct dis-amenity effects of freeways and demolition from urban renewal, as well as a
redistribution of metropolitan growth from core urban neighborhoods to the metropolitan fringe,
induced by freeways. These public policy choices, as well as generally weak regional governance
structures and highly fragmented local governments in many American metropolitan areas led to a rapid
depopulation of American urban centers at a magnitude not seen in any other developed country. In
recent decades, this trend of depopulation and decentralization has slowed, and in some cases, even
reversed. Many core cities are beginning to see a rebirth in their urban cores, and populations ticking
upwards for the first time in over half a century.
Unfortunately, due to increasingly strict zoning laws adopted over this same time period, many
American cities have "forgotten how to grow," in a sense, with zoning codes set to freeze
neighborhoods in amber rather than accommodate new growth. When depopulation was at its peak,
this wasn't a major policy issue, but as cities have begun to revitalize and their population base has
begun to grow, many cities are quickly running up against their own land use restrictions as they
become binding constraints. Many local governments, for a variety of reasons, have been unable to
accommodate the rising demand for urban housing with commensurate housing supply. A policy debate
now rages nationwide, searching for solutions to the housing crisis gripping many large American
metropolitan areas, and the hope is that this paper can provide a brief overview of the debate, the
nuances of housing and zoning policy, and potential paths to reform being looked at around the Nation.
Recent efforts in Minneapolis, Oregon, and Seattle have shown that substantial increases in up -zoning
and housing supply can be possible when the focus is on a city-wide conversation, rather than allowing
the conversation about zoning to get bogged down by parochial neighborhood commissions.
Neighborhood -based groups often are density -phobic and can wield inordinate veto -power over zoning
and development changes. While local neighborhood concerns must be taken into account, those local
concerns must be weighed against the broader concerns of regional and citywide housing organizations
and tenant advocates. After the major recent zoning reform in Minneapolis, the Century Foundation
summed up the arguments for, the backlash from, and the response to the backlash in reforming single-
family zoning. Though focused on single-family zoning in particular, the conclusion of the piece could
apply to excessive land use restrictions in any city or region:
"There has long been a consensus among researchers that single-family zoning is bad for
housing affordability, bad for the environment, and bad for racial justice. As a matter of
basic human dignity, moreover, it is humiliating for local governments to tell people of
modest means that they are not welcome in that community and that their children are
not welcome in the public schools. it is one thing for a market to discriminate by income;
markets function by providing incentives and rewards. It is an entirely different thing for
a government to put its heavy thumb on the scale of a market in favor of the wealthy,
and to say that those who cannot afford to live in single-family dwellings should be
banned from entire communities—that their presence would be, in essence, a "nuisance"
to be kept out, akin to an industrial factory or slaughter house."
The major crisis at the moment in many major American cities is one of a lack of sufficient housing units.
In the face of regional economic and job growth and the corresponding increase in housing demand,
housing supply is not keeping pace, driving up rents and homerp ices. The problems are similar across
many supply -constrained markets such as New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco and other major
American metropolitan areas. When demand for housing increases in an area, vacancy rates will begin
to drop, and when vacancy rates drop to a certain point (generally around five percent or so) renters will
begin bidding for a dwindling amount of available housing units, eventually causing upward pressure on
rental prices for all existing units (and I mean all, while it's true housing markets are segmented, there
are substitution effects between each market segment). When rental prices begin to rise, new private
real estate development projects will begin to "pencil out" for developers, and supply will be increased
to accommodate increasing demand. This increased supply raises vacancy rates, removing upward
pressure on rents, which helps to stabilize rental rate growth and keep areas more affordable in real
terms.
However, in the majority of American metropolitan area, increased supply can only be delivered on land
that is zoned for higher capacity than what is already used on a current parcel of land. Though it is true
that land can be "scarce" in large metropolitan areas, land that is zoned for higher density (i.e. available
zoned -capacity) is far scarcer than land generally (so much so that land zoned for higher density
development often comprises a miniscule fraction of total metropolitan land). In some metropolitan
areas, developers can receive "re -zonings" relatively easily, thus allowing supply to be increased
commensurate with demand, while in others zoning restrictions are not only strict but also rigid,
meaning that developers and investors end up competing not for land generally, but mostly for land
with sufficient zoned -capacity. This prevents new market entrants while dramatically driving up the
price of those scarce land parcels, impeding new housing supply. Additional zoned capacity, while raising
land values in the particular land parcels where up -zoning occurs, also increases competition in the land
markets for developers, and thus helps to increase housing supply as well by lowering the cost of
production of housing, increasing investor returns and attracting more investment into housing supply.
Unfortunately, the fact that rising rents tend to increase development as more potential projects
become financially feasible has caused some well-intentioned liberals (and the focus is on liberals here
because most large metropolitan areas are left-leaning on average) to believe that increased
development causes increases in rent, when in actuality lower vacancy rates cause both rising rents and
additional development (or, additional development to the extent allowed by zoning, of course). Thus,
many get the causality backwards, believing market -rate development increases rents. In an additional
unfortunate happenstance, this view of "bad developers" coming in to "raise rents" also fits with other
liberal priors, as most liberals have a healthy skepticism of the benevolence of large corporations or the
wisdom of unfettered free market dogma. While in many cases these priors and healthy skepticisms
serve us and society well, in the case of housing it unfortunately has had a disastrous impact on the
outcomes most liberals believe in: environmental sustainability, upward social mobility, housing
affordability, and alleviating racial and income inequality.
In many ways, and in many liberal cities, well-intentioned (and often well-educated) people who
generally have a healthy skepticism that market forces alone may not always be the answer to every
problem have adopted a near -dogmatic belief that market forces simply cannot be a major solution to a
problem. Nowhere is this clearer than when it comes to housing policy, where many believe that no
amount of supply can lower rental rates, despite all empirical evidence and expert consensus to the
contrary. Housing market denialism on the left is in many ways analogous to climate change denialism
on the right.
Now, if you're a wonk in the area of the housing and planning debate who accepts the basic economic
arguments, you're probably already ahead of us and about to point out that the old supply argument
has a hole: the time -old hypothesis about amenities and induced demand. For those not aware of it, it
goes something like this: "When a bunch of new market rate units deliver in a neighborhood, they
usually deliver towards the top of the market, and thus attract buyers or renters with higher incomes.
These buyers or renters, in turn, can attract particular retailers (think Whole Foods or Starbucks) which
may have some amenity value in and of themselves, and an influx of more individuals (think Jane Jacob's
`eyes on the street') can increase the safety of a neighborhood (or at least the perception of safety). As
rental rates and home prices for individual units are determined by both market -wide housing demand
and supply, as well spatial amenities and local neighborhood characteristics, increasing development
that brings higher income individuals to an area may drive up rents." This is a great argument, and one
that seems to have just enough elements of truth to it that it could give an economist pause. Setting
aside for a moment the morality of the implicit idea here that we should allow neighborhoods to
deteriorate, experience high crime, or be deprived of amenities in hopes of keeping them "affordable,"
we should investigate if this general idea has merit. The idea appears theoretically plausible: increasing
the supply of market rate units in one area, while putting downward pressure on regional rents, could
raise them locally (i.e. it could increase affordability globally while reducing it locally).
However, theoretical ideas about housing markets are a testable hypothesis, and empirical evidence is
all we can rely on in the face of ambiguous theory. In fact, such an empirical study has been done,
finding that the supply impacts of new market rate housing dominate any potential induced demand
effects. According to one of the few studies testing this niche hypothesis, in neighborhoods where new
apartment complexes were completed, rents in preexisting units near the new apartments declined
relative to those in neighborhoods that did not see new construction. Professor Monkkonen of UCLA,
responding to planning documents from the Southern California Association of Governments, sums up
the flaw in the induced demand analogy for housing:
"The package compares housing supply and affordability to [freeway expansion-]
induced demand on freeways... ...which they properly note is unlikely to alleviate
congestion in the long run. This comparison is not apt, because freeway access is free
and housing is not. Congestion occurs when the absence of prices causes a shortage. A
housing crisis occurs when a shortage of housing causes high prices. This crucial
difference means that new supply is almost useless in the former and incredibly
important in the latter."
Why would the supply effect of new housing dominate any theoretical "induced demand" effect? One
must remember that new private development itself is a response to market pressures, namely
increased market demand for housing at a particular location that is not being met with supply. In the
absence of new housing, wealthy individuals will still come to an increasingly desirable neighborhood,
regardless of if new housing is built to accommodate them. In the absence of new construction, these
individuals will simply take the next best thing, bidding up rents in existing units, with substitution
effects slowly pushing people down different market segments, ultimately increasing prices in even the
most affordable market rate units. A simple analogy is the game of musical chairs, but instead of each
chair going to the person who runs the fastest, it goes to the buyer willing to pay the most. Now imagine
adding more players to the game, but keeping the number of chairs constant. While simplistic, this is
functionally what is happening in housing markets across many major American metropolitan areas.
Many in the planning world (though none in the housing economics world) have tried to get around
housing affordability issues with rent control measures. While rent stabilization measures are often seen
positively for protecting the public against sudden and sharp rate increases, any long-term binding rent
control will ultimately put downward pressure on housing supply. This area of debate has been so long -
settled in the economics sphere, with near unanimous consensus from both theoretical and empirical
research, that we won't bother rehashing it here, but will simply provide a link for those interested.
Even rent stabilization is likely to be ineffective in the long run, as it too hinders housing supply:
"On rent stabilization, the strongest finding in Jenkins's overview appears to be that
tenants in noncontrolled units pay higher rents than they would without the presence of
rent control; one reason being that landlords need to make up the difference for lower
rents in controlled units. Interestingly, one study found that New York City tenants in
controlled units also had higher rents initially, because they were willing to pay more to
get into a rent -controlled unit with the understanding that they would have smaller rent
increases in the future. The net effect, however, is that tenants [in rent -controlled units]
don't save much in the long run—they simply trade higher rents now for lower rents
later ...... Given the current research, there seems to be little one can say in favor of rent
control. What, then, should be done to help renters obtain affordable, decent housing? A
better approach may be adopting policies that encourage the production of more diverse
types of housing (different densities, tenure types, unit sizes, etc.), implementing strong
regulations and practices to ensure housing quality and to protect tenants from abuses;
and providing targeted, direct subsidies to people who need help paying their rents."
Even those direct rental subsidies mentioned above can be counter-productive in zoning- and supply -
constrained markets, as they effectively increase "demand" for housing while supply is artificially held
constant, driving up equilibrium prices. Ironically, landlords and investors, those most often chastised by
well-meaning liberals vouching for public rental assistance, are often the main beneficiaries of direct
rental subsidies unless rental vacancy (and, thus, competition among landlords) is high. While rental
subsidies for poverty alleviation may be a prudent policy in rust belt housing markets such as Milwaukee
or Detroit, they make little sense in major supply -constrained markets as a policy to improve housing
affordability writ large.
Furthermore, any well-intentioned policy that attempts to saddle real estate developers with fees and
exactions beyond the marginal public expenditures needed to accommodate the development itself (i.e.
development impact fees), will end up counter -productively harming housing affordability overall. This is
because developers, and the investors who fund housing development, require a certain return on
investment, and anything that unnecessarily adds to those development costs or lowers potential
revenue (such as with rent control or inclusionary zoning) will lead investment to shift away from
housing production, thus lowering supply and raising equilibrium rents and prices. While such policies
are often popular among the public, given the stereotypical view of developers as deep -pocketed and
parasitic, it is ultimately renters and first-time homebuyers who will be the ones paying for any
exactions thrown upon developers in the form of higher equilibrium prices stemming from reduced
housing supply.
Additionally, existing homebuyers stand to benefit financially from this in three ways: (1) reduced rental
and for sale housing supply increases equilibrium prices, creating a windfall in property value for existing
homeowners who resist new development in the first place, (2) shifting the financial burden of providing
public goods onto developers means the tax burden is shifted off of homeowners, and (3) any spatially -
related public amenities paid for by fees on developers also capitalize into existing home values,
providing a second property value windfall. Given that existing homeowners are almost always wealthier
than renters and first-time homebuyers, this arrangement allows the wealthiest individuals in a
community to free -ride and capitalize on exactions that are ultimately paid by those who are less
affluent, sometimes dramatically so, an ironically regressive form of wealth transfer.
If you didn't catch it above, inclusionary zoning, something in vogue within contemporary urban
planning circles, was mentioned as something detrimental to housing supply and affordability. This is
because, similar to unwarranted exactions or rent control, inclusionary zoning comes at a cost to a
developer (either by being required to add extra units, increasing costs, or by forgoing a portion of
revenue for added units). Thus, the policy can create a few lucky winners, those who happen to get a
below-market rate apartment, at the expense of all other renters (whether they be wealthy or poor) and
first-time homebuyers. But we know what you might be thinking: what about offsets? Yes, oftentimes
offsets or other compensation (such as a density -bonus, negated fees, etc.) is given to developers in
exchange for additional income -restricted units. Thus, developers, if given offsets, should theoretically
not reduce supply in response to inclusionary zoning requirements, which is technically true.
It all sounds too good to be true, and, unfortunately, it is too good to be true. You see, many offsets
have a cost to the public, even if that cost isn't immediately apparent. Frankly, you can't get something
for nothing, and there is a downside to every artificial market distortion. Even density -bonus offsets, or
allowing developers to build more units in exchange for including income -restricted units, comes at an
unseen cost. The very fact that the existing zoning did not allow those units to be built without the
density bonus was the hidden cost to renters and first-time homebuyers because it was already
implicitly restricting housing supply. Even in the hypothetical example of inclusionary zoning coupled
with a land tax, as proposed in the appendix of this article, there would still be a market response, as the
example fails to consider that: (1) land uses may not be fixed, and (2) investment in real estate is also
not fixed. Thus, investors could redistribute their investments to other types of land uses (hotels, offices,
etc.) or other investment types altogether. We are not advocating to get rid of inclusionary zoning
requirements, even if they are secretly counter-productive, because attempts to get rid of inclusionary
zoning would also likely be counterproductive to increasing housing supply. However, it is imperative
that inclusionary zoning is not looked to as a sort of panacea for housing affordability writ large, and
indeed the proportion of housing units delivered under inclusionary zoning remains a tiny fraction of the
overall housing supply.
Increasing housing supply is the only long term and sustainable strategy for achieving some form of
overall housing affordability, and much of this will need to be done through the private market (given
the status of local, state, and federal budgets, a mass public infusion of housing supply appears unlikely).
While it is true the private market may not provide for those who are most desperate, diminishing the
overall affordability burden will help shrink the pool of those requiring housing assistance, allowing
social programs to be targeted towards those who need help the most. While many instinctively want to
reject this market-based assertion for housing policy, policymakers ignore market forces at their own
peril, as market forces will assert themselves independent of whether or not one believes they exist.
Zoning restrictions that prevent the private market from delivering the maximum amount of housing
units that they otherwise could in our cities must be seen for what they are, the moral equivalent of
tearing down people's homes, and anti -development advocates must acknowledge this fact point blank
if they believe that restricting more people from living in our neighborhoods is claiming some sort of
moral high ground against displacement. So often at public meetings the sentiment is expressed in
terms of "what are the developers giving back to this community?"
Well, first of all, they're providing places for people to live! Yes, they're building places for people to live,
so that those new residents don't push existing residents out of their places to live. Some may focus on
potential demolition impacts, and we should indeed be cognizant that large scale development may
involve disruptions to the lives of renters in the existing units to be demolished, and, as a matter less of
economic efficiency and more of moral imperative, that those renters receive some compensation. But
for housing affordability writ large, as long as the increase in density over existing numbers of units is
substantial, more development will ultimately make more poor people better off than it makes worse
off (i.e. as long as we're not simply replacing, say, four older units with four nicer units at a one-for-one
ratio). Second of all, new developments, and the corresponding residents, help to stabilize the city's
fiscal position, which helps fund the social programs many want in our cities, including the programs
that provide more affordable housing.
Zoning restrictions also have the effect of incentivizing additional sprawl, as development that cannot be
accommodated through infill in existing neighborhoods will ultimately be shifted to other areas, often
on the suburban fringe (or to other potentially less sustainable regions, for that matter). This outward
redistribution of metropolitan growth leads to larger distances between origins and destinations, and
thus higher vehicle miles traveled per capita, increased household transportation costs, degraded
regional air quality, and poorer health outcomes. Additionally, it hits the public and private sector's
finances due to the invariable need to provide extra infrastructure to serve more dispersed
development patterns, adding to private sector, as well as local, state, and federal government capital
and operating budgets (for example, more roads, school buses traveling further, more miles of utility
lines, less efficient heating and cooling, increased health costs, etc.). As a double -whammy, it hampers
the farebox recovery ratio of mass transportation systems by legally barring additional businesses and
residents from locating in mass transit walksheds. Though many localities and their residents are
concerned about the environment, and in particular climate change, restrictive zoning does more to
undermine our climate change goals than just about any other major government policy, increasing
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions per capita by putting origins and destination further apart and
accessible only using energy -intensive modes.
There are those who want some fundamental change to private property rights, to throw over the table
on our current housing system, or other goals to de-commodify housing or put it under something like
collective public ownership (perhaps even abolishing private home ownership). Such solutions may or
may not ultimately achieve the goals they intend to, but perhaps someday more substantial change will
be politically viable (for better, or for worse). But if the argument is that we can't work to change the
system we have in place right now to make it more just, and that we must wait for a "revolution" of
sorts, consider the words of author Alan Mallach:
"I have little tolerance with the line of argument that holds that all efforts are in vain as
long as the underlying economic or political system falls short of the ideal.
Representative democracy and the capitalist economic system, for better or for worse,
are the two conjoined frameworks that have defined the reality of American life for well
over a century and are likely to do so for the next century as well, assuming Western
civilization survives. Moreover, should they be replaced by anything fundamentally
different, whatever that is will probably be much worse. Finally, although I share many
people's belief that many things about American society need fundamental change,
including the racism that remains so resistant to change, i see radical change as being at
best a distant prospect. I do not believe that we should forgo the opportunities that exist
to change the lives of people and their communities in important ways, even while
injustice and racism may continue to exist, in the interest of afar -off and most probably
illusory better society. That posture is a luxury of the affluent that the poor cannot
afford."
In response to this national crisis, many regions are exploring and implementing reforms to zoning laws.
In some egregious cases, the repeated inability of local jurisdictions to make meaningful headway in
allowing enough new housing units is leading states to implement and explore preemption of local
jurisdictional zoning police powers to boost housing unit production. In Canada, much of the planning
and zoning powers have been regionalized or done at the provincial level, to ensure parochial interests
that attempt to exclude new residents from neighborhoods are less able to weaponize local zoning and
degrade regional housing affordability. Even the United States federal government and presidential
candidates have taken notice of this issue, along with several conservative think tanks who recently
supported legalizing density and transit -oriented development (did we ever imagine Cato and Smart -
Growth America on the same side of an issue? Housing crises make for interesting bedfellows). Other
options include having at -large representatives in charge of land use decisions rather than district -based
representatives. Examples of this include proportional representation -based elections, or ranked -choice
votins for multi -member at -large seats, helping to ensure transportation investments and land use
decisions are efficient and best for the city or region overall, while counteracting some of the challenges
of fragmented and district -based representation.
American cities have come a long way since their freeway -induced fall from grace in the 1960s -1990s,
and for some lucky cities the fundamental question has changed from how to attract growth to how to
accommodate it. This is, at its core, a problem many metropolitan areas and central cities wish
desperately to have, and this fact should not be lost on us. Many existential questions remain for dying
rural areas on the Great Plains or Rust Belt cities that continue to suffer under the weight of
deindustrialization, depopulation, and fragmented regional governance. There are not clear policy
solutions to the problems in those areas. To the contrary, the major housing crises facing regions such as
DC, San Francisco, and New York are at least partially artificial and self-inflicted by current policy
decisions, and, more importantly, the policy solutions to these problems actually exist. Policymakers,
planning staff, and the public at large must understand the moral imperative of increasing housing
production substantially, even if this ultimately changes neighborhood character. Every part of our
cities, rich and poor, has a role to play in accommodating growth, and more must be done to make sure
high -opportunity neighborhoods share in that burden.
Furthermore, though the belief is in vogue, we must vigilantly reject the notion that market -rate housing
supply is somehow antithetical to solving the housing affordability crisis. Preventing market -rate housing
supply will not prevent gentrification or displacement, it will in fact accelerate gentrification and
displacement. Some claim that we cannot "build our way to housing affordability," yet we also cannot
simply "subsidize our way to housing affordability" nor can we "not build" our way there. There will
simply never be enough tax dollars to deliver the sheer number of units needed to address this crisis,
and inclusionary zoning programs will produce paltry numbers of units at best, creating a few lucky
winners among the vast majority of working-class people left with the dire choices of staying or leaving,
or having a place to live or not. Market rate development, and a substantial amount of it at that, is the
only sustainable way to keep overall housing affordability in check over the long run.
We must, as policymakers, understand the difference between policies that people feel good about
(often the policies that give a false sense of security that we are making meaningful progress on our
goals), and those that actually work and bring us closer to our goals. Our hope is this letter has helped
frame the crisis we face, as well as what policy solutions exist that can actually bring us closer to the
places we all say we want to live in. While neighborhood character is an important consideration, we
leave you with a quote from Better Institutions which sums up the cognitive dissonance we must face up
to if we are to overcome this crisis and help the people we care about:
"We've been convinced that the built environment—not the people who inhabit it—is
what makes a community; that neighborhood integrity is about the character of
buildings, not that of our neighbors. This is not a liberal ideal. Rather than turn these
people away, we need to recognize that new residents are just people like us, looking for
a better life and new opportunities. Adding enough new homes so that they can find
somewhere to live is a very small ask. We hove to stop acting as though the subjective
value of 'neighborhood character' (which has always been and will always be a moving
target) is of equal importance to the hard economic realities of unaffordable housing,
inequity of opportunity, and homelessness. The latter issues are clearly of greater
importance, and if you're willing to sacrifice them at the altar of 'neighborhood
character' then you need to take a moment and seriously question your commitment to
progressive, inclusive values."
Thank you for your time, we hope you found this interesting and that you'll share this, or the ideas
contained within it, with anyone that you think may find it a worthwhile read. Remember, each and
every one of us, even doing something small, can make a big difference. That change begins with you.
Greetings policymakers,
Governance structure is not something the average American spends much time thinking about, but it
has impact on the outcomes of our lives, shapes the cities we live in, and affects the health and vitality
of our economy In many ways. While there is much debate in the United States regarding the structure
of the federal government, as well as the philosophy of federalism and delegation of power between the
federal and state governments, there is relatively little discussion about the structure of local and
metropolitan governance, outside of a few select areas. We think that this lack of discussion is
unfortunate, and we hope this issue brief can be the start of a healthy and robust debate that brings
about positive change.
The American system of governance is built on a principle of federalism, or the division of powers
between two levels of government of equal status (in the United States, this would be between the
Federal government and the State governments). The Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Inherent
advantages of this decentralized system include individual States acting as "laboratories of democracy,"
where, being that there are 50 semi -autonomous states, different policies can be enacted and tested at
the state level without directly affecting the entire country. As a result, a diverse patchwork of state -
level government practices is created, allowing for innovations in public policy. If any one or more of
those policies are successful, they can be expanded to the national level by acts of Congress.
Additionally, this decentralized approach follows a general Jeffersonian maxim of "the government
closest to the people serves the people best," emphasizing the American cultural belief in the greater
transparency and accountability of lower levels of government, An individual is generally more likely to
be able to get a few minutes to discuss an issue with their local representative in their state legislature
than they are with, perhaps, their federal representative, for example. By and large, Americans tend to
have greater levels of trust in cower levels of government,
Finally, this approach allows for competition between individual governments, which can increase
economic freedom. As summarized by the Mercatus Center, many individual governments enable each
of us to choose the one that best matches our preferences for government goods and services. If a city
or state raises taxes but doesn't use the money to improve services, citizens will leave for a better -
managed city or state. More generally, the threat of exit by people, firms, and entrepreneurs creates
competition among governments that limits governments' ability to exploit its citizens.
However, there can be discrepancies between local, regional, state, and national interests, and
policymakers must use caution when deciding which level of government is suitable for which task.
While competition can breed innovations, under certain conditions competition can encourage "race to
the bottom" or "free -riding" behavior, In the context of governance, race to the bottom behavior often
occurs when different levels of government, often competing to lower taxes, end up cutting public
services (such as education) in such a way that the region would be significantly better off if each
maintains those public services. Free -riding behavior is a related concept, where one local government
may benefit from regional public services but fail to contribute to the funding of those public services.
While there are many sources and examples of such deleterious behavior, the genesis that most often
comes up in the context of metropolitan governance stems from the spatial nature of many benefits,
costs, externalities, and taxation policies. In such instances, state legislatures may justifiably intervene.
Within the constitutional framework of the United States, state legislatures are uniquely positioned to
salving these types of problems. Many local powers are generally delegated by state governments to
local governments to implement and enforce, and how and at what level of government those-
authorities
hoseauthorities are implemented is at the sole discretion of the state government, unless a state's
constitution declares otherwise. While it may not be a well-known case to much of the American public,
the Supreme Court case Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh (1907) snakes clear the authority of states over their
local governments or other lower political jurisdictions:
"Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
entrusted to them...... The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the
absolute discretion of the State...... The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or
withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself,
or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All
this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the
citizens, or even against their protest. in all these respects the State is supreme, and its
legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will,
unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the Unites! States. ,although the
inhabitants and property owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their
property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other
reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued
existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the federal
Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences. The power is in the
State and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust or
oppressive exercise of it."
As such, states have a wide latitude and clear responsibility to intervene to promote the general
welfare, particularly in cases of misalignment between local government behavior and regional and
state needs. Generally, consistent with the maxims and ideas laid out at the beginning of this issue brief,
such interventions should only be applied where there is a clear and Logical case for improving overall
societal welfare and efficiency by altering, reorganizing, or preempting local government authority.
However, the remainder of this brief will give examples of when such interventions may be warranted.
Zoahna Exarnplex: "Not In My Backyard" -ism, or NIMBY -ism, and its relationship to zoning, housing, and
land use policies is one sof the most straightforward examples for understanding this concept. To
illustrate this, consider two general facts about increased development intensity and density.
(1) Many of the benefits of additional densldty and development intensity are broadly distributed
regionwide, such as more housing units putting downward pressure on regional home and
rental prices, more space for businesses putting downward pressure on regional commercial
rents, more efficient use of existing infrastructure and transportation facilities meaning less
need for regional expenditures on new infrastructure, higher farebox recovery ratios on mass
transit systems (meaning less need for taxpayer subsidies), lower transportation casts per capita
and improved regional air quality stemming from reduced vehicle miles traveled per capita,
(2) Many of the costs or dis-benefits of additional density and development intensity are highly
localized, such as more challenges for local residents finding on -street government -provided
parking spaces, higher levels of local traffic congestion (even as density reduces vehicle miles
traveled globally), aesthetic concerns about changes to neighborhood character, light, shadows,
or open space, or a perception of increased burden on local government services such as
schools (notwithstanding of course that new development also helps fund local government
services through property taxes).
This dichotomy between regionally distributed upsides and highly localized downsides means that local
neighborhoods, and likewise smaller local governments, are going to nearly always be more resistant to
new development, housing, businesses, or ether intensification of land uses than is socially optimal and
economically efficient for the region (unless a local ,government is desperate for investment). For some
countries, such as Japan where land use regulations are administered at the federal Level, this isn't a
problem. In the United States, however, land use regulations are a state police power that has generally
been delegated, all or in park, to local governments to enact and enforce.' This means that the level of
government least able to achieve an efficient outcome for the metropolitan region orthe state is often
tasked with decision-making power over land use regulations.
To illustrate why this can be an issue, imagine a simplified metropolitan area, where the entire area is
made up of only single unit rental houses. The metropolitan area is a simple 4x8 grid (32 squares total),
with each square containing 20 rental houses (640 units total). For simplicity, let's assume each rental
house has only one person.
Now let's assume the metropolitan area is split in half, with City A on the left and City B on the right,
with each city controlling, land use within its own borders:
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Now, in City AS, the same 180 residents are still against the rezoning, but 460 residents are in favor,
and the rezoning passes. The real world is obviously more complicated, residents' views on
development and the planning process are more complex, cities and metropolitan areas are generally
larger than a handful of blocks, zoning decisions are usually not decided by simple citywide vote, and
concerns about increased development can extend over a larger area than a one -block radius.
Nevertheless, this simplified example illustrates part of why, at least in the abstract, smaller
municipalities and more fragmented metropolitan areas can have added difficulty in allowing enough
new development to keep up with population and job growth, and to keep business and residential
rental rates in check. Some empirical evidence also supports this effect when looking within cities.
The example also illustrates a useful lesson about delegation of authority in governance structures. in
any area of public policy or regulation where the dis-benefits of decisions are highly localized and the
benefits of the decisions are highly disbursed or regional in nature, it makes sense to delegate that
authority to the lowest level of government that can effectively and efficiently weigh the full benefits
and costs of those decisions. If the regulatory or policy behavior of a local jurisdiction, such as a single
municipality or other sub -entity, is likely to have a deleterious effect on the metropolitan area or region
as a whole, it makes sense to instead delegate that regulatory or pollcymaking authority to a higher level
of government such as a metropolitan or regional government,
Transpartal`fon Planning Examples: Similar to land use policy, transportation planning and investment
in the United States suffers from similar coordination problems. There are three general areas in which
this manifests itself:
1. Transportation planning and investment in the United States is generally characterized by a
highly decentralized approach, with many overlapping jurisdictions and separate entities having
authorities in the process and decision-making. Metropolitan planning organizations, or MPOs,
were created with the intent of rationalizing transportation investment in metropolitan areas,
though their effectiveness at doing so has varied substantially. While a few MPOs play an active
role in decision-making, have a high technical capacity, and improve the efficiency of regional
investment outcomes, many remain relatively low -resourced with limited in-house technical
capacity, acting more as "pass-through" entities for transportation funds that simply "rubber
stamp" transportation plans created by local governments, rather than harmonizing or focusing
a regional strategy,
2. Transit agencies themselves often vary wildly in their ability to efficiently provide transit service
or to build and sustain mass transportation infrastructure. Some transit agencies are simply a
department of a local municipal government, while in other regions transit agencies serve a
large portion (though usually not all) of the metropolitan area. A few are even entities of a state
government, though this is still relatively rare in the US. More common still, many regions have
multiple overlapping transit agencies, with some agencies serving portions of the region
overlapping with local city- or county -provided transit agencies. Additionally, local transit
agencies almost never have direct authority over zoning and land use regulations near transit
stations, even on land that they own, irrespective of the tantamount importance of station area
land use to transit ridership and transit agency financial performance.
3. Lastly, infrastructure ownership varies widely by jurisdiction. In some areas local roads are
owned by local governments, with a few major roadways owned by state governments. In
others, all but the smallest roads are planned, constructed, and maintained by state
governments, and local governments have varying Levels of authority over the design of such
facilities. Transit agencies, with their buses usually relying on such roadways, almost never have
decision-making power over the design of the infrastructure that they operate upon.
All of these features of local governance, how transportation investment and decision-making is
organized and executed, how transit agencies are organized and what authorities they have, and what
entities control and own infrastructure, can hinder the development of efficient metropolitan
transportation systems. Many metropolitan areas in the US have highly balkanized, overlapping, and
sometimes competing transportation agencies and investment portfolios, leading to significant
coordination problems and inefficiency.
To illustrate the issues with metropolitan coordination, imagine a metropolitan area with three separate
cities, with each having various nodes that are given a certain number of points for ridership potential;
Now imagine each of the three cities has a separate transportation budget and its own planning process,
and let's say each city has enough money to buy three "segments" worth of mass transit (for simplicity,
assume they can only be built under the roads). Imagine each city gets "points" for each node it
connects, corresponding to the number on the node, and the entire region gets extra points for the
longest chain of nudes connected. Within each city, residents and planners decide on the following
transit lines meant to maximize their individual point totals, signified here in red;
CITY A
E25
In ther above example, the optimal strategy for each city when not taking into account the benefits
beyond their awn borders when making investment decisions produces 175, 200, and 40 points for
Cities A, 6, and C, respectively, for a total of 415 points. The longest chain is four nodes (we'll say four
points), so the grand total points for the region is 419. Let's say the MPO for the metropolitan area
simply "rubber stamps" each individual city's transportation plan, leading to this overall outcome.
Now consider an MPO that tastes a more active role in transportation planning, and imagine the
transportation funds are given to and controlled by the MPO directly, rather than the individual cities.
The MPO looks at regional needs, and after analyzing different investment options, decides to maximize
the total points for the entire region by investing as below shown below in red:
In this example, with the same amount of "transit segments" available (i.e. the same cost) the MPO
connected nodes worth 450 points, with the longest chain being 10 nodes long, so 460 points in total. In
fact, the optimal choice given these conditions actually precludes any mass transit segments being
allocated to City C, even if residents in City C are contributing taxes to the regional mass transit system.
This example used that edge case to illustrate the fact that the most efficient allocation of mass
transportation infrastructure in a region could very well mean that some parts of the region paying for
the overall system may not receive any service (again, purely on efficiency grounds, of course). Not all
parts of a metropolitan area are necessarily well-suited for mass transportation investments.
Now, one could reasonably make the argument that, absent an M PO or regional/metropolitan
government, the three cities could have negotiated amongst themselves to plan and build the second
more efficient alternative that serves more riders (or, gets more "points" in this illustrative example). In
some situations, this could certainly be true, especially in the case of three similar cities. However, the
reality in many parts of the United States is that metropolitan areas are fragmented into multiple
counties, and sometimes hundreds (or even thousands) of cities, villages, towns, or townships. This type
of coordination and negotiation becomes far more difficult with increasing numbers of local
governments, compounded by the fact that local governments will have a strong incentive to "free -ride"
and not pay into projects that benefit the region as a whole (i.e. they prefer to get the benefits of
regional infrastructure without paying the costs of it). Additionally, similar to land use policy, the
optimal transportation investment portfolio for each individual city is likely to be quite different from
the optimal transportation investment portfolio for the entire metropolitan area. Thus, there is little
compelling reason to expect that the ability of local governments to coordinate and negotiate would
lead to the optimal regional outcome, even if such coordination were easy and costless (and it usually
isn't). Lastly, the more fragmented the metropolitan area, the more likely that each independent
jurisdiction will want their "slice of the pie" in exchange for the regional taxes they pay in, causing
further deviation from the infrastructure provisioning that would be most efficient for the region as a
whole.
Transit agencies in the United States are often on the receiving end of substantial criticism, but not all of
these criticisms are warranted when taking, into account governance structures. In fact, given how we've
structured most transit agencies, some of the poor outcomes are quite predictable. Oftentimes there's a
negative sentiment towards mass transportation investment because transit agencies "don't make
money" or require subsidies to operate. Setting aside for a moment that something paying for itself
directly through user fees and being cost -beneficial to society are not the same thing, and that other
modes of transportation also don't pay for themselves directly via user fees (see Exhibit 6-1 herej,
financial sustainability is still a legitimate concern when attempting to provide a public service to help
the most people possible at the lowest societal cost. For mass transit systems, this financial
sustainability is called a "farebox recovery ratio," or the percentage of operating costs that are
recovered via passenger fares. High ridership is a key element to high farebox :recovery ratios, and
substantial (and walkable) commercial and residential density in a station's walkshed is crucial for
achieving high ridership (with a few key exceptions, including end of line termini stations which draw
from outlying markets, stations at major intercity rail or airport facilities, or major transfer facilities).
However, as discussed in the earlier example on zoning, the fragmented governance structure in
metropolitan areas creates barriers to the allowance of additional density, hampering ridership the
financial viability of mass transportation investments, devaluing investments by higher levels of
government, and burdening taxpayers at large with higher levels of taxes to subsidize the capital and
operating costs of said systems. Misplaced incentives from governance structure decisions may add
additional challenges.
To illustrate the issues of misplaced authorities., imagine we have a metropolitan region of an urban core
city and several suburbs, served by a regional transit system with 30 stations. Assume any system
operating costs above and beyond the fare revenue collected by the system is paid for by a regional tax,
a practice common in many metropolitan areas.
Suburb E
Suburb D
Suburb F
r Suburb E�
SubT5u
Suburb C
barb A
Suburb 8
Suburb H
Assume Suburb C is doing station area planning around its transit stop, and assume, being just outside
the urban core, there is demand for enough residential and commercial development in the station
walkshed to produce an average daily ridership at that station of 20,000. Assuming a fiat $1 fare for
simplicity and a two-way trip, that yields $14,6 million in annual fare revenue for the transit system,
However, given the relatively small geographic size of Suburb C, assume the land use planning process
around the station is more easily swayed by those living near the station who do not want more
development, similar to what is shown in the first example of this piece. Thus, the zoning that is
ultimately adopted for the station's walkshed only allows enough residential and commercial
development such that the average daily ridership at that station is 2,000, yielding $1.46 million in
annual fare revenue for the transit system (for simplicity let's assume the headways of trains that run on
the line is the same in both scenarios, and thus no change in operational cost). Thus, the transit agency
loses $13.14 million annually in fare revenue due to the zoning decision implemented by Suburb C,
But herein lies the key issue: Suburb C only pays for a small fraction of that cost because the transit
system is funded by regional taxes. Thus, Suburb C is able to roffload most of the cost of its regulatory
decision onto the other municipalities in the metropolitan area. Every other municipality in the region
would be better off if Suburb C allowed more development near its transit station, as it would reduce
the subsidy need for the transit system and lower regional tax burdens, but none of them have any say
in Suburb C's decision to ,prevent most development. Moreover, if Suburb C had to pay the full casts of
its decision, it's very possible that it would have allowed more development around its station, If the
entire metropolitan area had been a single city, that entity would been much more likely to allow the
maximum amount of development possible around the transit stop, since it would pay the full costs of
not allowing it. Similarly, if the transit agency itself had land use authority over station -adjacent land, it
too would have likely allowed the most development possible to increase its fare revenue and farebox
recovery ratio.
This example illustrates another useful lesson about governance structures. To the extent possible and
practicable, governance structures and fiscal policy should ensure that each sub -entity with decision-
making power bears the full costs (and reaps the full benefits) of their behaviors, thus ensuring that
their decision-making is as close to optimal as possible for the region and society at large. This is
analogous to economic theories about how to deal with externalities, ensuring the actor making the
decision internalizes the full costs of benefits of their decision.
This idea can also be illustrated in our third example on
infrastructure jurisdiction. imagine there is a job center Suburb D
in Suburb D, designated by the star. The job center is
large enough that the regional transit agency runs a
connector bus from a nearby rail stop, passing along
the dashed arterial through Suburb D and Suburb C.
Imagine this roadway facility is four lanes and mostly WAA it
serves local traffic. Let's say this bus route costs $2.0 : !`
million annually in fuel and labor to run, and the route CU
burb C.
receives $1,(I million in fare revenues each year (a ■
farebox recovery ratio of 50 percent, requiring a
subsidy of $1.0 million annually that gets paid by r
regional taxes). A.
Assume in this scenario Suburb C has jurisdiction over . ('
all the roadways within its municipal limits. Imagine the
arterial roadway in question experiences heavy peak
period congestion, which dramatically slows down the
buses that the regional transit agency runs between the job center and the rail stop in Suburb D.
Roadway expansion is not feasible nor desirable, given the already built-up nature of Suburb C. Given
this, the regional transit agency asks that, during the next routine street reconstruction, Suburb C
designate the center two lanes on the arterial as bus -only lanes to ensure bus speeds are not
dramatically reduced by peak period traffic congestion (for simplicity let's assume that reconstruction
needed to occur anyways, and thus there is no extra capital or maintenance cost to adding the bus -only
lanes). However, given that most users of the bus route do not reside in Suburb C, the local elected
officials in Suburb C have very little interest in speeding along non-residents to their jobs in Suburb D. As
such, the speeds on all buses on the route drop by half, requiring double the amount of buses to keep
the same headways than would be needed in free-flow conditions, raising the regional transit agency's
cost to $4.0 million annually for the route. At the same time, the longer travel times for riders on the
slowed buses results in some riders opting to drive to their workplace instead, lowering fare revenue to
$0.5 million annually. These two factors together lower the farebox recovery ratio on the bus route to
12,5 percent, and raise the annual subsidy need to $3.5 million, paid via regional taxes.
Again, here we see an example where Suburb C's jurisdiction over an infrastructure decision leads to
higher costs for the entire region, yet Suburb C bears only a small fraction of those costs (only to the
extent it pays the regional tax for the regional transit agency). If Suburb C were directly charged the $2.5
million in added subsidy needs owing to its decision, it may make a different decision about its
infrastructure. Let's say the arterial in question was instead owned by a State DOT rather than Suburb C.
While the political and economic interests of a state -level agency may better -internalize pressures to
ensure efficient metropolitan -scale transportation systems, the state government would also not
directly bear the cost of not allowing the regional transit agency to have bus -only lanes on the arterial
(unless of course the regional transit agency was part of the state government or run by the State DOT).
Given this, even a higher level of government would not directly bear the cost of its decision, only when
the agency that runs the regional transit system is the same agency with infrastructure decision-making
authority can it fully internalize the costs and benefits of its decisions..
In summary, throughout most of the united States, transit agencies often (1) inherit systems created
through a balkanized transportation planning process that almost guarantees sub -optimal
Infrastructure provisioning, (2) don't have authority over station area land use, even on land that the
transit agency itself owns, a key deficiency given the tantamount importance of station area
employment density, residential density, and walkability as generators of ridership, and (3) run buses
on roads over which they do not have decision-making power to ensure designs that allow buses to
move quickly and independently of congestion to lower operating costs, increase ridership, and lower
subsidy needs, nor do they generally have a say in making areas around their bus and rail stops
actually "walkable," with sidewalks, street trees, full crosswalks, and other features to encourage
transit compatible streetscaping, urban design and land use. In nearly all cases, these infrastructure
planning, infrastructure design, and land use authorities and decisions lie with separate entities that do
not directly internalize most of the short- or long-term costs of poor station area or transportation
planning. Given these governance structure deficiencies, it's a miracle that transit agencies are able to
operate effectively at aill
Taxation and Equity Examples: Carefully designed metropolitan governance structures can preserve the
benefits of local competition while preventing some of the predictable downsides, f=ragmented local
governance, common in the United States, creates unique challenges for taxation and equity, with
numerous openings created for free -riding, race to the bottom, and opportunity hoarding behaviors.
Metropolitan governance is focused on preventing several common behaviors, which often occur
simultaneously, that tend to damage overall societal welfare:
(1) "Free -riding behavior," a common concept across the economics field, occurs in the
metropolitan governance context when smaller units of government benefits from regional
public services but fail to contribute ;proportionately (or at all) to the funding of those public
services,
(2) "Race to the bottom behavior" occurs when different levels of government, often competing to
lower taxes and poach one another's firms, end up cutting public services (such as education) in
such a way that the region would be significantly better off if each maintains those public
services.
(3) "Opportunity hoarding behavior" occurs when lower levels of government with high
opportunities (high job access, excellent public services such as schools, etc.) effectively "wall
themselves off" from new entrants through the use of local authorities,
In the metropolitan ;governance context, free -riding behavior occurs when smaller units of government
benefits from regional services but fail to pay into them. Without taxation authority and public goods
provisioning of a higher level of government, such as a metropolitan government or a state government,
many metropolitan areas are forced to fund regional goods using loose agreements and negotiations
between major municipal governments within a metropolitan area. However, smaller (and often
wealthier) local governments will refuse to enter such agreements if they know that the largest
government (or group of largest governments) in the region will still agree amongst themselves to
finance major regional infrastructure. They can do this because they know that citizens of these local
governments, and the taxable value of assets in the local government's borders, cannot be easily
excluded from the benefits of major regional improvements (such as a regional airport or mass
transportation system expansion).
To illustrate, imagine a metropolitan region is contemplating the creation of a new airport, located in
Suburb B below:
Suburl
Sub
Suburb F
Suburb A
Suburb B
Suburb C
To pay for the initial capital construction cost, the municipalities in the region begin to negotiate on a
regional tax. The urban core jurisdiction and Suburb A supports the negotiations, as major stakeholders
in the Central Business District and suburban office parks realize the region's competitiveness depends
on a well-functioning and accessible transportation system. Suburb B supports the proposed measures
as well, as it stands to benefit from expected airport -adjacent development. However, Suburbs C, D, E,
and F opt out of the negotiations, as they correctly predict that the Urban Core will fund the new airport
construction along with Suburbs A and 6 regardless of whether they choose to participate in a regional
tax.
The potential outcome of this hypothetical arbitration is that Suburbs C, D, E, and F will free -ride on
regional infrastructure. Even worse, perhaps, if the region is too fragmented, not enough jurisdictions
and their associated tax bases will opt in for the airport to be built at all, harming the entire region's
competitiveness. These governance structure issues can also exacerbate equity concerns, as oftentimes
in the U.S. metropolitan context such small suburban jurisdictions are disproportionately wealthy
compared to the metropolitan region as a whole. Thus, jurisdictions with lower per capita incomes may
end up footing the entire bill for infrastructure assets that benefit the most economically prosperous
portion of the population.
Race to the bottom behavior is another common problem within metropolitan areas (and even
between higher levels of government), as Local jurisdictions offer competing tax breaks or policies to
poach firms from one another. This can lead to the creation of the metropolitan equivalents of parasitic.
"tax havens" or simply the defunding of public services that promote upward social mobility and
economic growth for the metropolitan region. As mentioned at the beginning of the piece, some
competition can be healthy, the threat of exit by people or firms constrains the taxation ability of local
governments. However, such competition can also lead to lower overall societal welfare when the
effects of tax revenue loss on public services are taken into account.
To illustrate, imagine a relatively consolidated metropolitan area with four local governments. The
metropolitan area consists of an urban core jurisdiction, Suburb At, Suburb B, and a very small Suburb C:
Suburb A
Suburb C
Suburb B
Imagine Suburb C consists mainly of land zoned and used by commercial and industrial activities, with a
relatively limited residential population. Race to the bottom behavior could occur if Suburb C were to
adopt business tax rates that are significantly lower than the rest of the region. Suburb C may start to
become home to numerous firms or corporate headquarters that relocate from the central business
district or suburban office parks in Suburbs A or B. Given Suburb Vs relatively small residential
population, the jurisdiction has the ability to maintain extremely low business taxes since it does not.
have much of a population to use city services (almost all the workers at the relocated firms in Suburb C
drive in from the other jurisdictions when they come to work). The firms in the region benefit greatly
from the metropolitan area's investments in public educations, infrastructure, and other public goods,
adding to their bottom lines and competitiveness. However, these firms no longer pay their fair share of
the costs to provide those public services, as they have relocated out of the jurisdictions where most of
their workers live. This represents a classic case of ",privatizing the benefits and socializing the casts.,'
The public Investments by other jurisdictions help the firms maintain their high levels of productivity and
profit, but they no longer share in those benefits.
While this arrangement is no doubt positive (even if unfair) for the firms that experience the greatly
reduced takes in Suburb C, these relocations can deplete the tax revenues in the ether jurisdictions,
which could lead them to cut public funding of local education or regional infrastructure. These cuts
could ultimately harm the region's long-term economic growth as well of the economic growth of the
state and national ,government. Whether this long-term loss exceeds the increased economic growth
due to lower taxes remains a fair question, but the secondary and long-term negative consequences of
this arrangement should not be ignored.
In highly fragmented metropolitan areas, this behavior can be compounded by an even easier ability of
firms to relocate among many different jurisdictions, especially in cases with very small local
governments. This can lead to overall spending on public goods to fall below the optimal amount across
the entire region, as individual municipalities engage in a "'race to the bottom" on taxes and spending to
poach one another's firms. Some of this can be alleviated by state -level taxation and distribution of
state funding, but attempting to solve such issues can be politically difficult for state governments, as
redistribution between local jurisdictions tends to creates winners and losers (Kaidor-Hicks
improvements are almost always controversial for the jurisdiction that loses).
The last common category, opportunity hoarding behavior, stems largely from the fact that in the U.S, a
vast array of public goads and social services are provisioned by either local governments or local
districts. This situation leads to a very common condition among local governments where the local
jurisdictions that are horse to those with high incomes end up having the best public services while
those jurisdictions with the poorest residents will often have struggling public services. Thus, the
jurisdictions with the populations most in need of public assistance, or upward social mobility -producing
public goods like schools have the fewest resources (per person) to provide such services. Nowhere is
this truer than with local school districts, which are often funded by local property taxes.
Under the idea of a "free market of local jurisdictions," where local governments compete to offer the
best public services at the best price point (lowest taxes), there at first glance appears to be some merit
to local control, funding, and decision-making over the provisioning of public goods and social services.
Different local governments can compete on taxes and public services, and individuals can "vote with
their feet" to move to those jurisdictions that do the best job. But here -in lies the practical flaw of this
idea in the American context: local governments can use their control over land use regulations to act as
exclusionary policies (such as single-family zoning, minimum lot sizes, and bans on apartment buildings),
effectively banning lower-income residents from moving to the jurisdiction.
While local governments cannot legally prevent residents from lower economic classes from entering a
jurisdiction, many local governments in the US, particularly smaller and wealthier suburbs and exurbs,
have land use policies and restrictions on housing supply that create a de facto "entry fee" to living in
certain communities, a fee often in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Even the ferny apartments that
are permitted are often so rare that their rents will be out of reach of many lower income potential
residents, Just as nefarious, the ability to bar lower income residents from entering a community also
means less required spending on social services for that particular jurisdictions, ultimately meaning that
:such areas can have lower effective tax rates since their populations require fewer public services per
person. The exclusionary behavior of such local jurisdictions can also drive up the value of individual
homes, since local housing supply is constrained and local public services are excellent, such that only
the wealthiest can live in such communities. This is what is meant by opportunity hoarding behavior, as
local governments can behave analogous to an offshore tax haven, allowing the wealthy to skirt away
from any investment in the broader upward -social mobility -producing public services and infrastructure,
but not suffering the downside of regional degradation in public services since they can still fund good
services locally. To the extent economic conditions correlate with racial groups, such a setup amounts to
an effective continuation of residential segregation by class and race,
While there is much that can and should be done to revitalize and aid local governments with
concentrated poverty, opportunity hoarding by nearby wealthy local governments in the same
metropolitan area is an invisible yet pernicious reason that such concentrated poverty in certain
jurisdictions continues to exist. Setting up conditions that allow lower-income individuals to escape
concentrated poverty to other wealthier jurisdictions with better public services also helps the poorest
jurisdictions get a handle on serving their neediest residents by reducing the scale of the challenge.
Being born into a poor local jurisdiction with poor public services, combined with exclusionary behavior
by nearby wealthier jurisdictions with good public services that prevent moving, contributes to
continued intergeneration poverty and lowered upward social mobility in the United States. By the same
token, it calcifies economic and racial inequality, and prevents citizens from achieving their potential,
often regardless of their individual efforts to work hard and improve their lives. While society may cling
to the feel -good stories of those who beat the odds, it at times forgets the vast majority for whom the
deck is stacked against, forgetting those who never make it out, and not interrogating why the odds are
so rare to be beaten in the first place..
Policy Q tip "on$; Metropolitan governance policy generally seeks to alleviate some of the deleterious
incentives local governments face due to intra -metropolitan competition andenhance coordination and
efficiency in metropolitan investments and social policy. It also seeks to align local incentives to aid
regional goals, and overcome issues with externalities that are spatial in nature. State governments are
best -suited to addressing these types of issues, given their authorities over local jurisdictions, but
certain policy approaches can allow for more local control than others, The Federal government can also
play an indirect role, by creating incentives and attaching objective and measurable strings and criterion
to federal funding, particularly with housing, transportation, and education funding,
Before we get into what actions higher levels of government can take, it's important to recommend
what strategies they should avoid. Generally, higher levels of governments should avoid any actions
that do not change the fundamental underlying incentives for certain local government behaviors. No
amount of reporting requirements, or other planning processes that are qualitative in nature, will
change underlying behaviors (Le., shaming local governments is unlikely to be successful at exacting
behavioral changes). Local governments and their planning departments will always excel in the
production of lengthy government reports and plans, and will always be able to write detailed prose
about how and why their actions are acceptable. States should avoid adding to local government
planning burdens with things that do not actually produce measurable results or where assessing results
is ambiguous, such as adding non-binding: planning requirements or setting qualitative metrics instead of
quantitative metrics. Similarly, states should avoid setting performance targets with no costs if they go
unmet, as such targets are unlikely to change behavior. Attempts to facilitate regional collaboration,
while certainly not harmful, will generally not produce local behavior that differs from local incentives
(for example, a local mayor or counciimember of a small exclusionary suburb may indeed believe the
region would be better off if their community provided more housing, but politicians still need to be
reelected within that jurisdiction and by that jurisdiction's constituents, and they ultimately answer to
them regardless of regional needs).
If a state desires to maintain some semblance of local control while still alleviating some of the
governance challenges dealt with in this issue brief, there are actions that effectively "regionalize"
decision-making authority while keeping the state government out of local and metropolitan affairs
thereafter. One such policy, common in Canada, is known as amalgamation, or the consolidation and
merger of units of local government, generally in an effort to rationalize decision-making authorities and
public service provisioning. An example of an amalgamation is shown below, where all independent
cities are effectively merged into one local jurisdiction which contains all the authorities and
responsibilities previously held by the former jurisdictions:
Suburb A
• Land Jim ftgu=aliun
• Transportation Planning
• tiArlmilp Pirk-up
• Fire and PGrim Servicca
Public Transportation
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The common U.5. approach of relying on city -county mergers via local referendums has two major
disadvantages: (1) when economic inequality between two jurisdictions is high (i.e. the particular case
where mergers or amalgamations could do the most good for the regional provisioning of public goods
and alleviation of spatial inequality), wealthier jurisdictions are understandably likely to resist
consolidation as they do not see it in their interest; and (2) U.S. city -county mergers generally don't end
up creating a unified government with a significant proportion of the metropolitan area's population
under one jurisdiction (for example, the merged city -county of Indianapolis had around 820,000 people
in 2010, while the Indianapolis metropolitan region had around 2.1 million people at that time). Thus,
the recent deference by states to local referendums in such cases means consolidations that could do
the most potential good for regional equity will likely not land up occurring without state action, and the
ones that do occur, while certainly helpful, are often still too small to alleviate many of the governance
challenges dealt with in this issue brief given that most U.S. metropolitan areas are significantly larger
than an individual county. In Canada, such mergers often happen at a larger or even metropolitan -wide
scale, and often occur without the consent of those cities to be merged.
Another option for solving regional governance problems, if further localized control is desired, is, the
establishment of "upper -tier" or metropolitan governments. Under this governance reform, a state
government establishes a regional or metropolitan government over a metropolitan area, and transfers
specific authorities from lower level governing bodies to the new metropolitan government. An example
of this governance reform is shown below, where individual local authorities are reorganized between
the lower -tier cities and the new upper -tier city:
Metropolitan Government ["Metro Council," "Lipper
-tier city," "Regional Governmental
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■ Taxation a ;d spending ■
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• Puhllc Flea`tiT ■
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Under this governance reorganization, state governments can decide which authorities and
responsibilities are best -handled at which level of government. In the above example, land use
regulation, long range transportation planning, provisioning of public transportation, and regional parks
and recreation are moved up to the new metropolitan government and out of the control of the lower
level municipal governments. However, unlike in the amalgamation example, the lower levels of
government remain, continuing to carry out some authorities and responsibilities. Additionally, spending
and taxation authority are shared in this reorganization, and the upper -tier government is given new
authority over infrastructure megaproject delivery, just as an illustrative example.
This governance reform is ideal if state governments want to maintain intra -metropolitan competition
but also want to prevent types of competition that would harm the region, prevent exclusionary land
use practices, and rationalize transportation and land use planning by delegating both authorities to the
some entity. This method of metropolitan governance, again common in Canada (for example, in
Vancouver), also has some analogous examples in the United States, such as the Met Council in
Minnesota's Twin Cities and Metro in the Portland, QP metropolitan area. Metropolitan Planning
Organizations, or MPQs, assuming they are consolidated and semi -coterminous with the metropolitan
area, make ideal organizations to designate as upper -tier governments to re -delegate certain authorities
to, particularly transportation planning, mass transit planning, and land use and zoning authority.
The advantage of this method is it allows for high flexibility. State governments could delegate long
range transportation planning to an upper -tier government, or they could delegate that as well as
ownership of transportation assets in the region, land use regulatory authority, public transportation
operations and capital construction, or any other functions or authorities they deem efficient for the
metropolitan government to have. It also allows lower -tier governments to maintain :some level of
control over authorities that may be more controversial to regionalize, whatever those may be.
Additionally, rearrangement of local authorities could take place over time, as the metropolitan
government proves its worth and competence, rather than having citizens gamble on having all
authorities go to a brand-new entity. Such an entity can also be set up internally in ways that improve
transportation planning efficiency by having at -large representatives (for example, proportional
representation -based elections, or ranked -choice voting for multi -member at -large seats), ensuring
regional transportation investments and land use decisions are efficient and representative for the
region overall, while counteracting, some of the challenges of fragmented and district -based
representation. Such governance structures can also be a stepping stone to eventual full regional
amalgamation, as was the case in the Toronto region.
The added benefit of both amalgamation or establishment of tiered government is that it allows state
governments to remain less involved in local affairs. While initially heavy-handed, the goal of both
approaches is to designate a new local government or reorganize local government so that such entities
can provide for local needs and solve local problems without the state government having to get further
or permanently involved. In essence, both of these approaches are an attempt to "help local
government help itself." Additional details on these reforms can be found in Ray Tomalty and Alan
Mallach"s America's Urban Future: Lessons from North of the Border delving, into many of the
advantages (and some shortcomings) of metropolitan governance reforms, an area of innovation where
Canada is a world leader. Such reforms could of course be implemented from the bottom up, but in both
Canada and the U.S. such instances are almost unheard of, no local government, mayor, or
councilmember generally has interest in giving up their authorities, regardless of the merit of such an
action. Thus, we believe state governments are the appropriate entity with the correct incentives and
authorities to make such governance reforms.
Some U.S. states, such as Illinois, have been considering such proposals, usually from the standpoint of
reducing expenditures {having high numbers of local governments creates a lot of duplicated
administrative spending), rather than gains in coordination, equity, or rationalizing of regional planning.
Evidence of the effect of government reorganizations on overall government expenditures is, however,
mixed. While consolidation can improve the efficiency of how tax dollars are used, consolidated regional
governments may be more likely to enact a higher level of regional public services, offsetting some or all
of the cost -savings (though, presumably gaining some benefit of better or increased public goods).
One-off or occasional reorganizing of local government authorities or municipal boundaries themselves
aren't the only ways to achieve the efficiency, equity, on coordinated planning that higher levels of
governments may be interested in. State governments have other tools at their disposal. One such tool
is revenue sharing mechanisms that seek to -foster greater collaboration between local governments in
a metropolitan region.
In an effort to fight against race to the bottom behavior and opportunity hoarding behaviors, the
Minnesota Legislature instituted a program of commercial -industrial tax -base sharing program within
the Twin Cities metropolitan area in 1971, colloquially known as the Fiscal Disparities Program.
Originally enacted In response to local governments offering competing tax breaks to poach one -
another's local businesses, supporters of the program claim it has increased equity in the region and
fostered more cooperation on regional needs. The program, combined with related historical efforts to
locate affordable housing around the entire metropolitan area, has often been cited as a contributor to
reduced income inequality and a reduction in concentrated poverty, removing some of the burden on
individual cities in the region. Even if one locality ends up being home to a disproportionate amount of
the region's low-income residents, it doesn't automatically mean public services in that jurisdiction will
be significantly worse. Alone of these efforts of programs would have been possible without state
actions.
State governments can indirectly incentivize certain behaviors by attaching strings to state funding.
Some bills, such as SB 3, in Utah. mandate that local governments choose from a menu of state-
aed std aimed at encouraging additional housing. The bill requires cities to adopt at least three
of those strategies as part of their state -mandated land -use and transportation plans to become eligible
for cash from the Utah Department of Transportation to invest in transportation corridors in their
communities, known as TIFF money.
Even more direct and ongoing interventions by states, such as states increasing their oversight of local
land use planning, can achieve more efficient local government behavior. This approach is also common
in Canada, and occurs to a looser extent in Oregon and Washington State. While land use controls in
Canada still are implemented by local or regional governments, local land use plans often must follow
input and be approved by the provincial level governments (and the key here is that provinces can and
do overrule local governments, this is not a "rubber-stamp" exercise). A more recent U.S. reform along
these lines includes the strengthening of California's Housing Element Law, which until recently was a
relatively toothless ceremonial planning activity that did not hold Local governments accountable for
failing to meet affordable housing needs (though challenges and inadequacies in the process remain).
Such oversight in assigning objective housing targets to local governments, with consequences for not
zoning for enough housing, can force local jurisdictions to allow enough housing while leaving them
some discretion in how to provide it (but, of course, not so much discretion that local governments can
find loopholes to implicitly bar the housing from being built).
Perhaps the most unambiguous reform available to state governments, and potentially the most
controversial, is the authority of states to directly implement land use decisions themselves or preempt
certain exclusionary activities. While preemption of local governments by states is not new, preemption
of local land use authority is relatively recent in the United States, but had increased in popularity given
increasing housing affordability issues. A timely summary from the Roston College Law Review found:
• "Commentators have long decried the pernicious effects that overly restrictive land use
regulations, which stifle new development, have on housing supply and offardabillty, regional
and national economic growth, social mobility, and racial integration. The frogmented nature of
zoning rules in the United States, which are set primarily at the local level, renders it seemingly
impossible to address these concerns systematically. Although there have been some efforts to
address local exclusionary tendencies and their suboptimal effects by means of greater state
control, these efforts, which remain contentious, have been limited to just o few states. In the
past few years, a new wave of state interventions in local zoning has appeared. These
interventions ore motivated in part by the harsh reality of housing shortages and skyrocketing
costs in significant parts of the country, which have made housing affordability a salient issue for
a broader segment of the papulation. At the same time, states have grown increasingly willing to
preempt local governments across a range of policy realms. This Article contends that the
confluence of these and other factors suggests the potential for a recalibration of the balance of
power between state and local governments in the realms of housing andland use regulation.
State governments are increasingly displacing local restrictions on new development, mandating
that municipalities permit certain forms of housing, and providing incentives for local
governments to adopt certain forms of housing. l argue that the current housing crisis justifies
bold new farms of state intervention. such interventions should expressly preempt certain
narrow elements of local law, rather than, as an earlier generation of interventions did, add
additional planning requirements, procedural steps, or potential appeals. At the same time,
these interventions can, and should, provide clear mechanisms for addressing significant
countervailing local interests."
This type of preemption is becoming more common, with a flurry of bills being seen in many states. The
recently passed bill in Oregon as well as proposed but failed bills in Virginia, Nebraska. Washington State
and Maryland, preempt local governments from pursuing exclusionary land use practices such as
mandating only single family homes, They leave significant discretion to local governments, but
implement more direct involvement in local zoning by explicitly prohibiting certain regulations. Perhaps
the most direct proposal, and, arguably, by far the most controversial, has been SB -50 in California. The
bill, first submitted as SB -827, opened the door to similar preemption bills across the United States, and
proposed to directly rezone areas near mass transportation lines statewide while implementing other
deregulations. A similar, but less direct form of California's bill was proposed in Washington State to
apply an automatic increase in zoned capacity in areas near transit only if more than 20% of households
in a municipality are rent burdened, allowing local governments to have a first crack at alleviating
housing affordability issues before direct intervention.
Finally, though the Federal Government of the U.S. plays an indirect role in land use and metropolitan
governance, it retains the abiity to attach requirements and Incentives to federal funding. Similar to
state governments, the federal government can incentivize certain lower level government behaviors
through strings attached to federal funding. While most federal transportation funding goes to states via
formula, Congress could tie certain requirements to the receipt of those funds, or attach strings to
discretionary grant programs. The Capital Investment Grant Program at the United States Department of
Transportation currently encourages, but does not require, transit -compatible land use policies near
proposed mass transportation facilities. This program could be altered to either mandate a certain
amount of deregulatory action surrounding proposed transit facilities, or to encourage it through policy
guidance and scoring criteria. Recently, the proposed bipartisan Build More Housing Near Transit Act
received 19 co-sponsors, indicating further congressional interest in this issue. If recent state level
activity is any indication, such proposals are likely to continue to be put forward. The United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, responding to an executive order, had been exploring
what requirements could be attached to their Community Development Block Grants for similar
purposes of addressing deficiencies in local government behavior. Additionally, federal programs and
funding could be used to encourage more state -level involvement on these issues.
Every level of government has a critical role to play in carrying out essential activities for our population,
and every level of government, working together, can bring -better functioning metropolitan areas to the
United States. Additionally, putting local and regional ,governments on an achievable path to work
through their own problems can free up capacities for higher levels of government to take on other
problems. A key point to remember is that, if metropolitan governance issues are not addressed, higher
levels of government will ultimately pay the price for shortcomings and inefficiencies, and the American
people will pay the price of opportunity costs.
We hope this issue brief has illuminated a wonky and previously hidden world of metropolitan
governance policy, the challenges of getting efficient and equitable behavior from local governments,
and the potential policy options higher levels of governments can take to tackle some of these daunting
structural challenges. We believe that local government, the government closest to the people, servers
the people best, but we also believe in setting up an overall framework where local governments can
succeed; drawing on more of the strengths of local governance, and fewer of its weaknesses. This
requires us to get the delegation of authorities, local governance structures, and incentives right, so that
each level of government can do what it is best -suited for, and so that regional and national interests
are protected as well. We hope this issue brief will lead to metropolitan areas that are more fiscally and
resource -efficient, more sustainable, more equitable, cleaner, happier, healthier, better -planned, and
perhaps, even more beautiful. Thank you for your time, we hope you found this interesting and that
you'll share this, or the ideas contained within it, with anyone that you think may find it a worthwhile
read. Remember, each and every one of us, even doing something small, can make a big difference. As
we stated in the beginning, we hope this can be the start of a healthy and robust debate that brings
about positive change for the American people. That change, of course, begins with you.
Item Number: 8.e.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Chris Ogren: snow removal - Willow Creek [Staff response included]
Kellie Fruehling
From:
Tyler Baird
Sent:
Wednesday, December 16, 2020 3:46 PM
To:
Council
Cc:
Juli Seydell Johnson
Subject:
snow removal Willow Creek
Council,
We received multiple messages through various platforms from Chris Ogren who you also received an email from. I
chose to respond through the gov outreach system where I received the complaint directly which was worded the same
as the email you received (included below). I have included my response below and their response back for your
reference.
Original Message:
I am writing to beg the City of IC to do a better job with snow removal in Willow Creek/Kiwanis Park this winter. On my
run this morning, the paths were in deplorable condition. The City has argued in the past that it doesn't clear all of the
paths because of supposed cross-country skiers (who would ski over grassy areas, not concrete), but the numerous
footprints on all of the paths demonstrate how many people walk or run in the park. This morning, a woman who
looked to be in her 60s told me that she had fallen. This is not acceptable. Today, even the parts of the paths that have
been clear in past years are covered with packed snow and ice; the sidewalk in the park along Benton St is in a condition
that would draw a fine for a homeowner, and the section connecting the main path to Aber/Teg at the east end of the
park is in bad shape. Being able to get out and walk or run is more important than ever during the pandemic. PLEASE
KEEP ALL OF THE PATHS IN THE PARK CLEAR OF ICE AND SNOW! Thank you.
Chris Ogren
140 Cardiff Circle
338-8253
My response:
Thank you for reaching out. We are clearing the trails throughout Kiwanis and Willow Creek parks this year for added
outdoor walking options during COVID-19. This does not mean we will be able to get to all trails right away and the new
COVID-19 routes are not a priority over our traditional routes. What this means is as people walk on the trails first or if
the trails start to thaw and then freeze there may be some packed down spots. All snow systems bring different
challenges and this wet weekend snow followed by freezing conditions tend to be the most challenging. Our crews will
do their best to remove the snow and have treated all areas with salt. We ask for some patience as we adjust to miles of
additional trail clearing this season. I have been forwarded an email you sent as well and these answers serve those
questions as well. Here is a web page with a link to the trails our department clears with the COVID-19 additions noted:
https://www.icgov.org/trails
Reach back out if you have additional questions and we hope you enjoy getting outside this winter!
Response in return from resident:
Thank you for the quick reply. I appreciate that you will clear the paths throughout Willow Creek and Kiwanis this year. I
understand that people walking on snow packs it down and turns it into ice. I must say, though, that I saw very little
evidence of treatment with salt on the paths in the park today, and I am not convinced that your crews "have treated all
areas with salt." I will look forward to better conditions on the park paths in the weeks to come.
Best regards --
Chris Ogren
For context, we also had a call fielded at the Rec Center thanking us for the job we did clearing snow in these same
parks.
Thank you,
-Tyler Baird
CITY OF IOWA CITY Tyler Baird CPRP
UNESCO CITY OF LITERATURE Superintendent of Parks & Forestry
WWW.1000V.ORG p: 319-356-5100 x2069
0 2275 S Gilbert St.
Iowa City, IA 52240
Kellie Fruehling
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
RISK
Hello and happy New Year,
jflorman2@aol.com
Friday, January 1, 2021 11:27 AM
parksand recreation
Council
Thanks!
Late Handouts Distributed
(Date)
just went out to ski in Willow Creek Park, but it's too icy—I want to survive long enough to get the COVID vaccine!
However, I then went on a walk through the park, and I want to thank you SO much for all the work you do clearing the
paths of snow and ice. They were dry as a bone and the sand/salt you put on in certain spots even made the ice that's
falling now not treacherous. There are many people out walking and even running, and, of course, legions of children and
adults sledding on Willow Creek Hill.
I miss the days when we could skate on City Park Pond, and hope sometime soon outdoor ice skating will return to Iowa
City.
Finally, you may well already be aware of this, but if not, here's an interesting article about how Edmonton is designing
space and activities for winter enjoyment: https://www.edmonton.ca/city government/initiatives innovation/wintercity-
strategy.aspx
Thanks again—a wonderful way to start the new year.
Best,
Jean
Item Number: 8.f.
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Gosia Clore: Appeal to a denial of a COA [Staff response included]
Kellie Fruehling
From: Anne Russett
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:55 AM
To: Eleanor M. Dilkes; Kellie Fruehling
Subject: FW: FW: Appeal to a denial of COA
FYI
From: Gosia Clore <gosiaclore@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 12:06 PM
To: Anne Russett <Anne-Russett@iowa-city.org>
Cc: Adam Clore <adam.clore@gmail.com>; Kellie Fruehling <Kellie-Fruehling@iowa-city.org>
Subject: Re: FW: Appeal to a denial of COA
ASK
Hi Anne,
Sounds good to me.
Thanks.
Gosia
On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 2:28 PM Anne Russett <Anne-Russett@iowa-city.org> wrote:
Hi, Gosia --
We received your email regarding your appeal of the denial of COA. In order to get this on a City Council agenda we
need to set a public hearing in advance. Here is our plan for moving this appeal forward:
1/19/21: Request that the City Council set a public hearing for 2/2 to discuss this item.
2/2/21: City Council public hearing.
Would this schedule work for you? This will likely be on the regular 7 PM formal meeting agenda.
Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks, Anne
From: Gosia Clore <gosiaclore@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 19, 2020 4:42 PM
To: Council <Council(a@iowa-city.org>
Subject: Appeal to a denial of COA
Mimecast Attachment Protection has deemed this file to be safe, but always exercise caution when opening files.
To Whom it May Concern,
We would like to appeal the denial of Certificate of Appropriateness issued by the HPC.
Please refer to the attached.
Thank you.
Most truly,
Gosia and Adam Clore
1133 E Court St
Iowa City, IA 52240
Disclaimer
The information contained in this communication from the sender is confidential. It is intended solely for use by the recipient and
others authorized to receive it. If you are not the recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or
taking action in relation of the contents of this information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful.
Iowa City
Historic Preservation Commission
City Hall, 410 E Washington Street, Iowa City. IA. 52240
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATENESS
1133 East Court Street
A meeting of the Iowa City Historic Preservation Commission was held as an electronic meeting through the
Zoom meeting platform on December, 10, 2020. The following members were present: Kevin Boyd, Sharon
DeGraw, Cecile Kuenzli, Quentin Pitzen, Jordan Sellergren and Austin Wu.
By a vote of 1-5 (Boyd, DeGraw, Kuenzli, Sellergren and Wu voting no), the Commission failed to approve a
Certificate of Appropriateness for an alteration project at 1133 East Court Street, a contributing property in
the Longfellow Historic District. The proposal consists of the removal of the aluminum siding in its entirety
and either the installation of new aluminum siding or cement board siding over any existing historic siding or
the removal of any existing siding in its entirety, regardless of condition and replacement in cement board in a
configuration to be determined by the applicant. The existing trim is also proposed to be replaced regardless
of condition, in a configuration to be determined by the applicant. The proposal was denied for the
following reasons:
The proposal does not meet the standards set in section 3.2, 4.11 or 4.14 because it would remove
historic wood siding and trim that is not deteriorated and replace it with new material that does not
match the existing (4.11), or it would cover original wood siding with another material leading to the
potential of increased further damage (4.14). In addition, the Commission could not find an
exception to the guidelines to approve the proposal since this proposal does not meet the conditions
of any documented exceptions, the situation is not uncommon, and the guidelines are not silent or
unclear on this topic (3.2)
• Wood siding and trim details combine to make one of the most important defining characteristics of
historic districts and are therefore protected by the guidelines.
• The proposal contradicts Standard 2 of the Secretary of the Interior's Standards, included in the
historic preservation guidelines which reads, "the historic character of a property shall be retained
and preserved. The removal of historic materials or alteration of features and spaces that characterize
a property shall be avoided."
While aluminum siding covers the existing original siding, impacting the historic character of the
house, it is a reversable condition since the removal of the aluminum siding would expose the
historic siding and trim. Removal of the historic siding, however, would permanently alter the
historic character of the house, unless the material was deteriorated and the new material match the
original
An alternate proposal, as described by the Commission, is approved separately on the Certificate of
Appropriateness for the porch reconstruction project.
The decision may be appealed to City Council, which will consider whether the Historic Preservation
Commission has exercised its powers, and followed the guidelines established according to this Title (Title 14
of Iowa City Zoning Code), and whether the Commission's action was patently arbitrary or capricious (Iowa
City Zoning Code, Article 14 -8E -2D). To appeal, a written letter requesting the appeal must be filed with the
City Clerk no later than 10 business days after the date of the filing of this certificate.
Kevin Boyd, Chair
Iowa City Historic Preservation Commission
Jessica Bristow, Hi oric Preservation Planner
Department of Development Services
12/15/2020
Date
CITY OIF IOWA CITY
www.icgov.org
January 5, 2021
ATTACHMENTS:
Description
Judy Pfohl: thank you
Item Number: 8.g.
Kellie Fruehling
From: Tyn Cae Neighborhood <tyncae.neighborhood@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2020 6:30 PM
To: Council
Subject: thank you
AA
RIIK
Thank you for including Kiwanis Park in your snow removal plan. This past snow was deep and heavy. The ice is always
a problem but thank you for listening to us and trying.
Judy Pfohl
Ty'n Cae Neighborhood President
--,-tB. h
Kellie Fruehling
From: Geoff Fruin
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 8:52 PM
To: Shannon Tackes; Ron Knoche; Council; Bruce Teague; tafF gMts Distributed
Subject: RE:
Ms. Tackes,
(Date)
Thank you for reaching out and making us aware of the situation. I do hope your daughter was able to safely remove her
vehicle.
I will look into the matter and make sure any inappropriate behavior is addressed. If your daughter has additional
information on the incident please have her reach out to me.
Thank you again for the emailing.
Geoff Fruin
City Manager
From: Shannon Tackes <sktackes@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:29 PM
To: Ron Knoche <Ron-Knoche@iowa-city.org>; Council <Council@iowa-city.org>; Bruce Teague <Bruce-Teague@iowa-
city.org>; Geoff Fruin <Geoff-Fruin@iowa-city.org>; Ashley Monroe <Ashley-Monroe@iowa-city.org>
Subject:
RISK
Mayor Teague, Council Members, Mr. Knoche -
I regret to inform you of a disturbing incident of rudeness and insensitivity by two of your city works employees. My
daughter is a resident of Iowa City and a student at U of I. Last night she returned home to Iowa City after being home
for the holidays. Upon her return, her vehicle became stuck after attempting to enter her alley at 14 North Dodge Street.
When the streets were plowed her alley entrance was blocked. She foolishly thought she could rev the car up over the
snow embankment and became stuck. At 1:00 a.m. a generous citizen pushed her vehicle out of the alley to a nearby
parking spot. Unfortunately, when she attempted to leave for work today her car was stuck in several inches of snow. As
my daughter was attempting to dig out her vehicle, two Iowa City employees pulled into the alley (in a white truck
labeled, City of Iowa City). They made eye contact with my daughter, laughed at her, shoveled some snow from the
street, and continued on their way. They never asked her if she was okay, asked her if she needed any assistance; they
just continued to gawk and laugh at her as they got back into the city truck. While I understand coming to my daughters'
aide was not the responsibility of these workers, I expected some human decency and sensitivity toward another
struggling human being. As a parent who has to live away from my child as she attends University, I rely on the human
compassion of others to be there in my child's time of need. And yes, I do put city workers higher on the list simply given
their responsibilities to the community. The actions of these men today were heartless and cruel and I certainly hope
this is not the behavior your city tolerates from its city employees. I would like to note that the workers had shovels, a
plow, and a snowblower in the back of their truck. It would have taken no time at all to help her yet instead they left her
crying helpless in the snow.
Concerned Parent
Shannon Tackes
(319)670-9920
Kellie Fruehling
From: gjzim@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 7:24 AM
To: council
Subject: American flag on sign
RISK
Greg Zimmerman DVM
All Pets Veterinary Clinic
301 Kirkwood Ave Iowa City IA 52240
319-338-8625
Late Handouts Distributed
(Date)
I was informed by city staff that I am not allowed to show the American flag on my lighted sign in front of my hospital. I find
it interesting that my building was allowed to be defaced by protesters with impunity, while I am not allowed the same 1 st
amendment rights. It would appear that there is selective enforcement of city codes. I started my practice in 1977 and am
ashamed of the way the city has been run the last few years. Local newspapers, several local and national radio
programs and Sen. Grassleys office are interested in the outcome of this incident.
Greg Zimmerman
Kellie Fruehling #� v
From: Martha Norbeck <martha_norbeck@hotmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, January 3, 2021 1:57 PM
To: Council Late Handouts Distributed
Subject: Changes to zoning for economic and environmental benefit
I - H 2 -
(Date)
RISK
Dear Council Members,
Thank you for your in-depth discussion of the Carson Farm at December 15 work session. I went back and
listened after making comments on agenda item 10b. on December 15. 1 am grateful for the opportunity of
extended dialogue offered by the work sessions.
I was glad to hear many good questions about the economic and environmental consequences of long-term
planning in Iowa City. This is great for the Carson farm. I look forward to hearing you revisit and deepen this
conversation.
The discussion inspired by the Carson Farm reinforces my conviction that it is important to take a hard look at
zoning rules.
• Allow duplexes and tri-plexes by right in all residential zones.
• Loosen the limits, and encourage the provision of, accessory dwellings.
Here is a list of various reasons I encourage this change:
When I started design for an infill project in east Iowa City I was shocked to see that a duplex was only
allowed on a corner lot. This makes no sense - particularly in a neighborhood where many pre-existing
duplexes happily coexist with single family homes. A duplex is currently for sale near south east junior
high for $199,000. That's two families who could own their own home for $100K. We need more of this -
modest size homes at a modest price - which is extremely hard to achieve with a new single family
home. Good luck finding a single family home for $100K.
Within my block, I can count 7 seniors living alone in houses over 1,200 sf. "Nearly 90% of people over
age 65 ant to stay in their home as long as possible." (AARP) But many are living in 3 bedroom homes
with no good policy to facilitate staying in their home. Give them the right to convert to a duplex and
use the proceeds from that sale to fund aging in place and energy efficiency improvements to their
home; or make it financially possible for them to afford to stay in their home on a fixed income; or
provide a space for a caregiver to live next to, but not with, someone who wants to maintain their
independence.
Builders can sell a single structure with 2 or 3 dwellings for more money than a single home.
Smaller living units require fewer resources per unit to construct and operate. This is better for the
environment and for affordability.
SEARCH TERMS:
• Minneapolis End Single Family Zoning
• AARP "Aging In Place: A State Survey of Livability Policies and Practices."
• Urban Institute "American Seniors Prefer to 'Age in Place' - But what is the right place?"
Martha Norbeck
906 S 7th Ave.
Iowa City, Iowa 52240